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Recent research on social cognitive deficits associated with serious mental illness 
(SMI) has demonstrated a range of emotion processing difficulties, from emotion 
perception to emotion regulation. Whereas emotion perception deficits are well 
documented in this population, little is understood about emotion regulation and the 
relationship of emotion regulation to other abilities and impairments. 
Method. Participants included 41 individuals with SMI recruited from a day 
rehabilitation program. Assessments included a range of functional domains, including 
symptom severity, neurocognition, social cognition, emotion regulation, and social 
functioning.  
Results. Emotion dysregulation was hypothesized to be associated with more 
severe positive symptoms, poorer neurocognitive functioning, and poorer social and 
community functioning. Results were mixed across the various assessments. There was 
some evidence of a relationship between psychiatric symptom severity and emotion 
dysregulation. However, global neurocognition explained very little of the variance in 
emotion regulation. Individuals with poorer emotion regulation tended to have poorer 
self-reported social functioning, and positive symptom severity accounted for some of the 
variance in this relationship. Path analysis modeling summarized these relationships. 
 Conclusions. This study demonstrates that emotion regulation explains variance in 
social functioning, but much remains to be understood about how emotion regulation 
relates to other biosystemic domains in this population. Limitations in valid assessment in 
the SMI population hinder ongoing progress, and this should be a key focus of future 
research, as orthogonal functional domains require individual attention in clinical 
assessment and research. Assessing segregated processes and investigating interactions 
among those processes reveal important relationships among subgroups of this population 
that would otherwise be missed. Though symptom severity and neurocognitive 
impairments have historically been the focus of treatment development for SMI, this 
work clearly demonstrates that individuals with SMI also have impaired emotion 
regulation abilities. Furthermore, that these abilities share an interactive relationship with 
social functioning and symptom severity reinforces their importance as potential 
treatment targets. Integrating emotion regulation skills training into the psychiatric 
rehabilitation toolkit is therefore a worthwhile future endeavor. 
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PATHWAYS TO SOCIAL FUNCTIONING VIA EMOTION REGULATION  
IN PEOPLE WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS 
CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
The biosystemic paradigm of psychopathology conceptualizes human functioning 
as a complex network of interrelated processes and mechanisms (Spaulding, Sullivan, & 
Poland, 2003). Those processes and mechanisms can usefully and heuristically be 
organized into five categorical levels of analysis (in order of most molecular to most 
molar): neurophysiological, neurocognitive, social cognitive, sociobehavioral, and 
socioenvironmental. Psychopathology is conceptualized as the result of abnormal or 
deficient operation of those processes and mechanisms across all levels as they interact to 
maintain stable functioning. Although the processes are causally linked throughout the 
biosystem, for the purposes of treatment and rehabilitation, they are independent enough 
to require separate, specific targeting. Biosystemic approaches to psychiatric 
rehabilitation therefore encourage research that addresses functioning at all the respective 
levels.  
The last decade of research on schizophrenia has seen an expansion of focus from 
the neuropsychological level of analysis to the social cognitive level, in part because it 
complements biosystemic psychopathology and also because measures of social 
cognitive impairments appear to be more proximal than measures of neurocognitive 
impairments to real world behavior and to psychosocial treatment effects. A broad range 
of deficits in social cognition are well-documented in the serious mental illness (SMI) 
literature (Corrigan & Penn, 2001b; Penn, Sanna, & Roberts, 2008). Furthermore, 
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difficulty processing social information has wide-ranging functional implications, as 
normal processing is fundamental for social and occupational relationships, as well as 
general community functioning. The development of social cognitive paradigms for 
schizophrenia has primarily been guided by the analysis of cognitive processes thought to 
be essential to basic social functioning and found to be impaired in SMI. These include 
paradigms that range from molecular perceptual processes to more molar processes that 
neuropsychologists would consider to be in the executive domain. 
On the more molecular end of the biosystemic spectrum, most research on the 
social cognitive deficits associated with SMI has focused on emotion processing. This 
research has shown that individuals with schizophrenia have a range of difficulties in 
processing emotions, from difficulties in perception of others’ emotions to difficulties in 
expression and regulation of one’s own emotions. The clinical significance of these 
deficits in emotion processing is demonstrated by their association with dimensions of 
adaptive social functioning (Couture, Penn, & Roberts, 2006).  
The difficulties in emotion processing observed in SMI, particularly emotion 
regulation, and their relationship to other biosystemic and functional domains, are the 
focus of this dissertation. The following sections address, in turn, (1) the basic concepts 
of emotion perception and emotion regulation as they are used in contemporary research 
on schizophrenia; (2) the nature of impairment in emotional functioning in schizophrenia 
and other serious mental illness; and (3) treatment approaches that target emotional 
impairments. Analysis of previous findings and other background information indicates 
that further progress in assessment and treatment will require a better understanding of 
the relationships between emotion impairments and other aspects of serious mental 
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illness. The subsequent sections describe an empirical, quantitative analysis of those 
relationships. 
  
4 
 
CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS 
Definitions 
Social cognition. Social cognition is defined as “the processes and functions that 
allow a person to understand, act on, and benefit from the interpersonal world” (Corrigan 
& Penn, 2001a, p. 3). There are generally considered to be four domains of social 
cognition: (1) attributional style, or judging the causes of events; (2) theory of mind, or 
understanding the contents of others’ minds; (3) social perception, or perceiving social 
cues in social situations; and (4) emotion perception, or recognizing emotional 
expressions from facial, vocal, and postural cues. Individuals with SMI have been shown 
to have deficits in each of these areas (Corrigan & Penn, 2001b; Feinberg, Rifkin, 
Schaffer, & Walker, 1986), pointing to a pervasive deficit in the social cognitive domain.  
These deficits have functional implications, as each of these domains of social 
cognition is associated with functional dimensions such as social skills, social problem 
solving, and broad community functioning (Addington, Saeedi, & Addington, 2006; 
Brekke, Kay, Lee, & Green, 2005; Corrigan & Toomey, 1995; Ihnen, Penn, Corrigan, & 
Martin, 1998; Kee, Green, Mintz, & Brekke, 2003; Kim, Doop, Blake, & Park, 2005; 
Mathews & Barch, 2010; Mueser et al., 1996; Pinkham & Penn, 2006; Poole, Tobias, & 
Vinogradov, 2000). Thus, deficits in social cognition have both proximal and far-
reaching consequences for daily functioning. 
 Emotion. Much of the research on social cognitive deficits in schizophrenia has 
focused on emotion processing. Indeed, emotional abnormalities have long been observed 
as one of the hallmark features of schizophrenia (American Psychiatric Association 
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[APA], 2000; Bleuler, 1950; Kraepelin, 1919). A discussion of these abnormalities must 
begin with a conceptualization of what emotions are and how they are normally 
processed.  
Many researchers have theorized about what emotions are and how they are 
generated. The result has been many similar theories and considerable historical debate 
regarding a consensual definition of emotion (Bloch, Moran, & Kring, 2010; Kleinginna 
& Kleinginna, 1981; Solomon, 2010). Among these are such classic theories as the 
James-Lange, Cannon-Bard, and Schachter-Singer theories. William James (1884, 1890), 
one of the first psychologists, theorized about emotion. The James-Lange theory posits 
that an emotional event is perceived and causes physiological arousal; that physiological 
arousal is interpreted, and emotions occur as a result of that interpretation. This theory 
was later supplanted by the Cannon-Bard theory, which posits the opposite: an emotional 
event is perceived and simultaneously causes physiological arousal and emotion 
(Cannon, 1932). Still later, Schachter and Singer’s (1962) two-factor theory was similar 
to the James-Lange theory but emphasized the role of cognition in the generation of 
emotion. This theory posits that an emotional event is perceived and causes physiological 
arousal; that arousal is given a cognitive label which accounts for the situational context.  
Each of these classic theories emphasizes (1) the importance of the occurrence of 
an event, (2) perception of that event, (3) physiological arousal, and (4) emotional 
responses. Gross and Thompson (2009) have combined the salient factors of these and 
the many other theories of emotions into the modal model of emotion. The modal model 
reflects the core features of emotion emphasized across theories and represents a 
consensual understanding of how emotions are generated. Gross and Thompson (2009) 
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establish three core features of emotions. The first feature regards appraisal: Emotions 
arise when an individual attends to an event, perceives it, and appraises it for its meaning 
(including its personal relevance, familiarity, and valence). Thus, an emotion requires 
both attention to a stimulus and an appraisal of that stimulus as pertinent to one’s goals. 
The second feature regards the changes that occur as a result of the first feature: 
Emotions are multi-faceted phenomena that involve systemic changes – in thoughts 
(subjective experience), behavior, and physiology. The final feature regards the flexibility 
of emotional responses: The systemic changes associated with emotions are rarely 
obligatory. It is this final feature which makes emotion regulation possible, as it is the 
flexibility of emotional responses that is regulated. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, the modal model’s emphasis on the 
typical features of emotions seems most pertinent to understanding what emotions are 
and how they can disrupt biosystemic processing when their regulation is dysfunctional, 
as in SMI. Such an understanding of how emotions are generated is foundational for the 
following discussion of how emotions can be regulated. 
Emotion regulation. Gross and Thompson’s (2009) definition of emotion thus 
stimulates a definition of emotion regulation: Emotion regulation is a heterogeneous set 
of processes that are automatic or controlled and influence emotions in oneself, others, or 
both. Thus, emotion regulation strategies influence how emotion is experienced – the 
quality, intensity, timing, and dynamic features of thoughts, behaviors, and physiology. 
This definition conceptualizes emotion regulation as the regulation of emotions, versus an 
alternative conceptualization of regulation by emotions. This second conceptualization 
refers to how emotions regulate thoughts, behaviors, physiology, or even other people. 
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The focus of the present analysis is to evaluate how systemic processes are themselves 
regulated, thus motivating the choice of a definition consistent with the former 
conceptualization.  
This definition prompts discussion of the core features of emotion regulation. 
First, both positive and negative emotions can be regulated, and they can either be 
increased or decreased (Gross & Thompson, 2009). The focus of the majority of the 
research on emotion regulation has been on how individuals decrease negative emotions 
or increase positive emotions. However, such a focus ignores strategies that increase 
negative emotions or decrease positive emotions – strategies that might be associated 
with psychopathology. The question arises: Does a pathological excess of negative 
emotion arise from underutilization of strategies associated with positive emotion 
changes (i.e., decreasing negative emotions, increasing positive emotions), for example, 
or alternatively, from overuse of strategies associated with negative emotion changes 
(i.e., increasing negative emotions, decreasing positive emotions)?  This question is as yet 
unanswered. 
A second feature of emotion regulation is that regulation can occur either 
consciously or unconsciously (Gross & Thompson, 2009). Thus, emotions can be 
deliberately changed, or they can be regulated automatically, via habitual processes. For 
example, a reaction of disappointment to the receipt of an unsatisfactory gift might be 
deliberately hidden (or suppressed) initially; but this reaction may become automatic if 
repeated over time. Importantly, it is unclear whether the distinction between conscious 
and unconscious regulation is dimensional (i.e., continuous) or categorical (Gross & 
Thompson, 2009). That is, it is possible that emotion regulation may have some 
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characteristics of both. Moreover, it is possible that emotion regulation may be a 
multidimensional phenomenon with categorical characteristics.  
Third, no strategy of regulating emotions is inherently adaptive or maladaptive 
(Gross & Thompson, 2009). Consideration of the context in which the emotion is to be 
regulated is always key in an evaluation of the adaptive nature of a strategy (Gross, 1998; 
Thompson & Calkins, 1996). For example, whereas habitual suppression of emotional 
reactions is generally associated with poor functional outcomes (reviewed below), 
adopting this strategy in a situation such as receiving an unsatisfactory gift may be the 
most adaptive response for social functioning. 
Finally, emotion regulation involves changes in how emotional responses are 
coordinated (Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004). As discussed above, emotional 
responses entail systemic changes – coordinated and interrelated changes in thoughts 
(subjective experience), behavior, and physiology. Various strategies of regulating 
emotions are associated with differences in how and when these components of 
emotional responses are changed. 
Emotion Regulation Strategies 
Once an emotional stimulus is perceived and appraised, many strategies exist for 
changing the type, timing, experience, or expression of emotions (Gross, 1998). These 
strategies can be organized along several dimensions. One dimension separates strategies 
into those that are internal (e.g., suppressing disappointment) versus external (e.g., taking 
a walk to defuse anger; Thompson, 1994). Another dimension focuses on the resources 
used to regulate emotions by separating strategies into those that focus on modifying 
cognitions (e.g., reinterpreting a loved one’s death as the end of suffering) versus 
9 
 
behaviors (e.g., seeking social support) versus situations (e.g., hiding controversial 
artwork from conservative visitors; Eisenberg et al., 1995). A final dimension focuses on 
when various strategies impact the emotion generative process by separating strategies 
into those that attempt to change the cause of the emotion (antecedent-focused strategies; 
e.g., avoiding offensive acquaintances) versus the response to the emotion (response-
focused strategies; e.g., engaging in aerobic exercise to decrease physiological and 
experiential components of emotion; Gross & Muñoz, 1995). This dissertation will focus 
on the antecedent- versus response-focused dimension, as it appears to be the most 
influential in the literature and the most useful for understanding the abnormalities in the 
use of these particular strategies in SMI.
1 
The modal model of emotion implicates areas in the emotion generative process 
where regulation might occur: changing the situation, attention, appraisal, or response. 
Antecedent- and response-focused strategies vary in the time at which they occur in the 
emotion generative process (Gross, 2001; Gross & Muñoz, 1995). In the modal model of 
emotion, antecedent-focused strategies occur before appraisals and can affect the 
situation, attention, or appraisal. These changes thereby alter the emotional response 
(Gross, 2002). In contrast, response-focused strategies occur after appraisals and attempt 
to change an emotional response that has already begun to occur (Gross, 2002).  
Antecedent-focused strategies. Antecedent-focused strategies are grouped into 
four families: situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, and 
cognitive change (Gross, 2002).  
Situation selection and situation modification make it more or less likely that an 
emotional situation will occur that leads to desirable or undesirable emotions. They serve 
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to alter an emotional situation that has already occurred to modify the emotional impact. 
The “situations” targeted by situation selection and situation modification strategies can 
be either internal (e.g., thoughts) or external to the individual.  
Attentional deployment strategies are used to select which aspect of a situation is 
attended to, and they are typically used when it is impossible to use situation selection or 
situation modification strategies. Common examples of attentional deployment are 
distraction and concentration. With distraction, attention is deployed to a less 
emotionally-arousing aspect of the situation or away from the situation; with 
concentration, attention is deployed to the situation. Rumination, common to many forms 
of psychopathology, is an example of concentration (Gross & Thompson, 2009).  
Finally, cognitive change strategies alter the meaning attached to an emotional 
event. An extensively-researched example of cognitive change is reappraisal (Gross, 
2002; John & Gross, 2009; Ochsner & Gross, 2009), a strategy in which the meaning of a 
situation is interpreted in such a way as to alter the emotional response.  
Response-focused strategies. There is only one family of response-focused 
strategies, called response modulation (Gross, 2002).  
Response modulation strategies attempt to change emotional responses once they 
have already been elicited. Common examples include the use of drugs and alcohol 
(Morris & Reilly, 1987), exercise (Thayer, Newman, & McClain, 1994), relaxation 
(Borkovec & Costello, 1993), and suppression. Suppression refers to the hiding or 
avoidance of an emotional expression and has been widely researched as an emotion 
regulation strategy (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes, & Scott, 1999; Purdon, 1999; Richards & 
Gross, 2006; Salters-Pedneault, Steenkamp, & Litz, 2010).  
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Reappraisal and suppression. Reappraisal, an antecedent-focused strategy that 
can alter an emotional response before it has been initiated, and suppression, a response-
focused strategy that alters an emotional response that has already begun, have different 
affective, cognitive, and social consequences.  
Affective consequences. Individuals who tend to use reappraisal as an emotion 
regulation strategy report fewer symptoms of depression, more satisfaction with their 
lives, higher self-esteem, higher levels of optimism, and higher levels of general well-
being, versus individuals who tend to use suppression (Gross & John, 2002, 2003). 
Moreover, individuals who use reappraisal are better able to regulate negative moods 
than are individuals who use suppression.  
This may be, in part, because reappraisal tends to be effective at decreasing the 
experience of negative emotions, whereas suppression tends to have no effect (Gross, 
1998, 2002; Gross & John, 2002, 2003). Both strategies are effective at decreasing 
behavioral expressions of disgust (Gross, 1998, 2002); however, suppression increases 
sympathetic nervous system activation, whereas reappraisal does not (Gross, 2002). That 
is, individuals who habitually suppress negative emotions continue to experience the 
negative emotions at at least a physiological level; in contrast, individuals who use 
reappraisal may actually experience less negative emotion. 
 Cognitive consequences. Suppression appears to require more cognitive 
resources, thus using resources typically allocated towards other processing. The result is 
impaired verbal memory, including memory for social information such as peoples’ 
names (Gross & John, 2002; Richards & Gross, 2000). No memory impairment is 
observed when individuals use reappraisal to manage emotions (Gross & John, 2002; 
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Richards & Gross, 2000). Given the pervasive cognitive deficits associated with SMI, the 
effect of emotion regulation strategies on cognitive resources is especially relevant. 
 Social consequences. Consistent with these differences in affective and cognitive 
consequences are differences between reappraisal and suppression in social 
consequences. Individuals who reappraise have more social support, both emotionally 
and instrumentally; and they are more likely to seek out social support than individuals 
who use suppression (Gross & John, 2002). Individuals who reappraise are more likely to 
share their emotions with others (Gross & John, 2002, 2003). Consequently, they are 
better liked by their peers (Gross & John, 2002, 2003). Individuals who suppress tend to 
avoid the attachment and intimacy associated with close relationships (Gross & John, 
2003). Suppression even appears to have negative consequences on a conversational 
partner – interacting with a person who suppresses is associated with increases in blood 
pressure, whereas there appears to be no impact on blood pressure when interacting with 
a person who reappraises (Butler et al., 2003). The result of these social consequences is 
that individuals who habitually reappraise tend to have improved interpersonal 
functioning relative to individuals who suppress (John & Gross, 2004).  
Neural Correlates of Emotion Processing 
The previous discussion has focused on the social cognitive domain and its 
relationship to the neuropsychological and sociobehavioral domains. But in a biosystemic 
paradigm, abnormalities potentially extend to more molecular levels of organismic 
functioning, including neurophysiology. The human brain is designed for processing 
social and emotional information and contains neural circuits specifically designed for 
those purposes. 
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Emotional appraisal system. Across electrophysiological, neuropsychological, 
and functional neuroimaging studies, the amygdala, insula, striatum, and medial 
orbitofrontal cortex are consistently implicated in emotion processing (Bush, Luu, & 
Posner, 2000; Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Davidson, Jackson, & Kalin, 2000; Denny, 
Silvers, & Ochsner, 2010), with activations during rises in emotion and attenuations 
during reductions in emotion. Although individual experiments have implicated 
additional areas, the contribution of the above regions has been repeatedly documented 
(Brunet-Gouet & Decety, 2006). 
 The amygdala is broadly implicated in detecting the emotional salience of a 
stimulus and generating physiological reactions to emotional events (Adolphs, 2002, 
2003; Aleman & Kahn, 2005; Denny et al., 2010; LeDoux, 2000; McDonald, 1998; van 
Rijn, Aleman, & Kahn, 2005). Moreover, it appears to have particular importance in the 
perception of others’ emotional states, especially perceptions of basic fear and sadness 
(Adolphs, 2002, 2003; Calder, Lawrence, & Young, 2001). Although each of the areas in 
this emotion processing network is activated for all types of emotions, the insula and 
striatum (and, in general, the basal ganglia structures) are specifically implicated in the 
evaluation of potentially distressing and aversive stimuli (Scott, Heltzeg, Koeppe, 
Stohler, & Zubetla, 2006; Straube & Miltner, 2011). Finally, the medial orbitofrontal 
cortex is implicated in evaluating the affective valence of a stimulus and its contextual 
meaning (Davidson & Irwin, 1999).  
Emotion regulation system. Attempts to regulate emotions require modulation 
of the emotional appraisal system. Specifically, across studies, reappraisal consistently 
invokes a network including the lateral prefrontal cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, dorsal 
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anterior cingulate cortex, and lateral orbitofrontal cortex (Denny et al., 2010). The 
prefrontal regions are the areas most tied to reappraisal and suppression, as they are 
associated with developing alternative ways of conceptualizing an emotional situation 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2009; Ochsner et al., 2004). Moreover, these areas are 
implicated in general cognitive control of emotion (Allman, Hakeem, Erwin, 
Nimchinsky, & Hof, 2001; Banich et al., 2009; Green & Malhi, 2006; Ochsner & Gross, 
2005) and development of adaptive responses to shifting social situations. The prefrontal 
cortex and anterior cingulate cortex appear to serve an inhibitory role in modulating 
activity in the emotional appraisal systems reviewed above. Increased activity in these 
areas is correlated with decreased activity in subcortical structures such as the amygdala. 
As no direct connections exist between the lateral and dorsal regions of the prefrontal 
cortex and the amygdala, the medial prefrontal cortex may serve as the link between 
cognitive control of emotion and emotional processing (Green & Malhi, 2006). In 
general, these structures serve a top-down interpretive function for emotional stimuli 
being processed in subcortical structures in a reciprocal, interactive manner (Denny et al., 
2010; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 EMOTIONAL ABNORMALITIES IN SMI 
The foregoing discussion summarized the basic concepts pertinent to researching 
emotion processing in SMI and serves as a foundation for discussing the nature of the 
impairment in emotion functioning in SMI. Individuals with SMI demonstrate 
abnormalities in all aspects of emotion processing – from perception of others’ emotions 
to experience and regulation of their own emotions.  
Emotion Perception 
Individuals with schizophrenia have a general deficit identifying the correct 
emotions associated with facial expressions (Feinberg et al., 1986; Novic, Daniel, & 
Perline, 1984; Salem, Kring, & Kerr, 1996; Schneider, Gur, Gur, & Shtasel, 1995; 
Walker, McGuire, & Bettes, 1984). Whereas psychiatrically healthy individuals 
identify an average of 71% of emotional facial expressions correctly, individuals with 
schizophrenia accurately identify just 64% (Kohler et al., 2003).  
Several studies have attempted to determine the specific features associated with 
this emotion perception deficit. Individuals with schizophrenia commit more errors 
when identifying negative facial expressions than when identifying positive facial 
expressions (Borod, Martin, Alpert, Brozgold, & Welkowitz, 1993; Muzekari & Bates, 
1977; Van’t Wout et al., 2007; Zuroff & Colussy, 1986). Specifically, individuals with 
schizophrenia appear to be impaired in the recognition of negative emotions such as 
fear, anger, shame, and disgust (Dougherty, Bartlett, & Izard, 1974; Kohler et al., 2003; 
Mandal & Palchoudhury, 1985) but not positive emotions such as joy and happiness 
(Dougherty et al., 1974; Kohler et al., 2003).  
16 
 
Accompanying this better recognition of positive versus negative emotions is 
increased efficiency in processing positive emotions in schizophrenia (Silver, Bilker, & 
Goodman, 2009). Happy facial expressions are not only processed more accurately in 
schizophrenia, but they are also processed more rapidly and efficiently than sad facial 
expressions. Nevertheless, individuals with schizophrenia process emotional 
expressions more slowly and less efficiently than healthy controls. Therefore, it appears 
that recognizing emotional facial expressions takes longer and is less productive in 
schizophrenia than in comparison participants. 
  Of note, individuals with schizophrenia also appear to be impaired at 
recognizing neutral facial expressions. One study found that they accurately identified 
70% of neutral facial expressions, compared to 86% correctly identified by comparison 
participants (Kohler et al., 2003). Both groups most often misidentified neutral 
expressions as happy or sad. However, of the neutral expressions misidentified by 
individuals with schizophrenia, 23% were mislabeled as disgust, versus 5% in the 
comparison group. Thus, individuals with schizophrenia appear to have a negative bias 
in their emotion perception. Not only are individuals with schizophrenia impaired when 
asked to identify neutral facial expressions, they are also impaired when asked to 
identify neutral faces (i.e., indicate whether they have seen the face before; Silver et al., 
2009). Thus, individuals with schizophrenia are impaired in processing neutral faces, 
regardless of whether they are evaluating its emotional content or its identity; but they 
are more impaired when their task involves emotional processing. 
Furthermore, whereas increasing the intensity of a facial expression aids control 
participants’ identification of the emotion, individuals with schizophrenia benefit 
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significantly less from this compensation (Kohler et al., 2003). That is, they are 
impaired at recognizing mild emotional expressions (correctly identifying 5% fewer 
expressions than controls) but even more impaired at recognizing extreme emotional 
expressions (correctly identifying 7% fewer expressions than controls). Interestingly, 
this suggests that increasing the intensity of emotions is unlikely to aid emotion 
perception in schizophrenia. 
Consistent with these reported difficulties in facial emotion perception, 
individuals with schizophrenia also experience difficulty identifying emotions 
expressed in voices (Hooker & Park, 2002; Vaskinn et al., 2007). In affective prosody 
tasks, they have more difficulty identifying negative emotions, with a particular 
impairment for identifying sadness (Bozikas et al., 2006) and fear (Edwards, Pattison, 
Jackson, & Wales, 2001). This is the same pattern observed in visual emotion tasks. 
However, this is in contrast to what is observed in healthy controls, wherein negative 
emotions are easier to perceive in voices than positive emotions (see Edwards, Jackson, 
& Pattison, 2002, for review). Interestingly, this impairment is also present in 
individuals with schizotypic personality traits (Phillips & Seidman, 2008). Schizotypal 
Personality Disorder is considered an attenuated form of schizophrenia, representing a 
premorbid stage of the disorder (Raine, 2006). Therefore, that impairment recognizing 
emotions in vocal prosody is identifiable in schizotypy suggests that this difficulty may 
be fundamental to schizophrenia. 
Integrated emotion perception tasks allow participants to benefit from both 
visual and vocal affective cues. These more ecologically valid tasks more closely 
approximate actual stimuli encountered in daily life. In a videotaped emotion 
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perception task with just video (i.e., no audio), individuals with schizophrenia have 
more difficulty identifying happy emotions than controls; however, they perform as 
well as controls when identifying sad or angry emotions (Bellack, Blanchard, & 
Mueser, 1996). This more accurate perception of positive versus negative emotions 
parallels the results reported above with static visual stimuli. When audio is added to 
the video, individuals with schizophrenia have more difficulty identifying sad emotions 
than controls; however, they perform as well as controls when identifying happy or 
angry emotions. This suggests that the vocal cues help individuals with schizophrenia 
identify happy and angry emotions. However, integrated cues do not appear to help 
their perception of sad emotions.  
Emotion Paradox 
As discussed previously, similar neural systems are implicated in emotional 
expression and emotion perception (Brunet-Gouet & Decety, 2006). As emotion 
perception is abnormal in this population, it follows, then, that emotional expression, and 
possibly emotional experience, may also show abnormalities.  
Schizophrenia has been characterized by flat affect since its very 
conceptualization (Bleuler, 1950; Kraepelin, 1919), and indeed flat and inappropriate 
affect continue to be considered hallmark characteristics of the disorder (APA, 2000). 
However, individuals with schizophrenia report emotional experiences consistent with 
the levels reported by psychiatrically healthy individuals. This discrepancy between the 
reduced expression but self-reported normal experience of emotion in schizophrenia has 
been termed the “emotion paradox” (Aleman & Khan, 2005). 
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Emotional experience. Some research reports that individuals with 
schizophrenia demonstrate reduced experience of positive affect (Livingstone, Harper, & 
Gillanders, 2009; Reske et al., 2007; Schneider et al., 1995; Suslow, Roestel, Ohrmann, 
& Arolt, 2003)  and increased experience of negative affect (Livingstone et al., 2009; 
Suslow et al., 2003). However, other studies have found that these individuals self-report 
similar levels of emotional experience as psychiatrically healthy controls in the 
laboratory (Gur, et al., 2006; Kring, Kerr, & Earnst, 1999; Kring & Neale, 1996). This 
seems at odds with the increased reporting of anhedonia, defined as the diminished 
capacity to experience pleasure, in this population (Horan, Kring, & Blanchard, 2006; 
Kirkpatrick, Fenton, Carpenter, & Marder, 2006; Phillips & Seidman, 2008).  
The resolution of the discrepancy between normal self-reports of emotional 
experience and increased self-reports of anhedonia may lie in the affective valence 
being assessed. Individuals with schizophrenia report experiencing significantly more 
negative affect and significantly less positive affect in their daily lives than healthy 
controls (Myin-Germeys, Delespaul, & Van Os, 2005). This diminished daily 
experience of positive affect supports their increased reporting of anhedonia but may in 
part be related to biased expectations, whereby they avoid engaging in rewarding 
activities because they do not expect to derive pleasure from them (Watson & Naragon-
Gainey, 2010). Nevertheless, it appears that, compared to controls, individuals with 
schizophrenia spend a significantly greater proportion of their days experiencing 
negative emotions and a significantly lesser proportion of their days experiencing 
positive emotions. Overall, the research indicates that, on average, individuals with 
schizophrenia are able to experience emotions to a similar degree as normal controls, 
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but their individual experience clearly differs from that of psychiatrically healthy 
controls. 
These experience sampling findings are supported by findings from a mood 
induction task, in which individuals with schizophrenia became less happy in response 
to happy induction and less sad in response to sad induction than controls (Schneider et 
al., 1995). This suggests that they have an attenuated emotional experience. 
Interestingly, they are also sadder during happy induction and happier during sad 
induction than controls, indicating some degree of inappropriate emotion induction in 
schizophrenia.  
In addition to these behavioral findings are physiological findings of abnormal 
emotional experience. Individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate greater skin 
conductance than normal controls in response to affective stimuli (Kring & Neale, 
1996). This suggests that these individuals are experiencing heightened physiological 
arousal and is in contrast with the idea that they have a diminished capacity to 
experience emotions. Neurologically, individuals with schizophrenia exhibit reduced 
activation in emotion processing circuitry (right amygdala, left orbitofrontal cortex, 
fusiform gyrus, cuneus) in response to non-aversive (though still affectively arousing) 
stimuli and near normal to above normal activation in emotion processing circuitry 
(medial prefrontal cortex) in response to aversive stimuli (Taylor, Liberzon, Decker, & 
Koeppe, 2002). These physiological and neurological data indicate that emotion 
processing may be somewhat disrupted in schizophrenia, which may affect the 
experience of emotion. 
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Emotional expression. The crux of the emotion paradox is that although 
emotional experience appears to be within normal limits, emotional expression appears to 
be abnormal in schizophrenia. Affective flattening, the restriction in the range of 
emotional expression in response to emotional stimuli, is a characteristic symptom of 
schizophrenia (APA, 2000; Kring & Neale, 1996). Thus, individuals with schizophrenia 
appear to have a disjunction between their near-normal emotional experience and their 
flattened expression of this experience. 
In daily life, individuals with schizophrenia are overall less facially expressive 
than psychiatrically healthy controls (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992; Kring & Neale, 
1996; Mandal, Pandey, & Prasad, 1998; Martin, Borod, Alpert, Brozgold, & 
Welkowitz, 1990; Schneider et al., 1995; Tremeau et al., 2005). Specifically, they 
spontaneously smile less often and for a shorter period of time. They also use fewer 
facial coverbal gestures (facial or head movements intended to illustrate or replace 
speech) and use fewer words in emotional conversation (Gottheil, Paredes, Exline, & 
Winkelmayer, 1970; Tremeau et al., 2005). Further, of universally recognized 
emotions, they appear to have the greatest impairment expressing happiness verbally 
(Gottheil et al., 1970). Interestingly, overall facial expressiveness and the number of 
facial coverbal gestures have been found to depend on the number of words used in this 
population (Tremeau et al., 2005). This again highlights the interaction between 
neurocognition [here, specifically alogia, another common symptom of schizophrenia 
(APA, 2000)] and social cognition (here, specifically emotional expression). 
Individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate reduced spontaneous, involuntary 
facial activity in response to a variety of affective stimuli in the laboratory (Gaebel & 
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Wölwer, 1992; Martin et al., 1990). Research indicates that, like healthy controls, 
individuals with schizophrenia make more positive facial expressions in response to 
positive film clips than negative facial expressions in response to negative film clips 
(Kring & Neale, 1996). However, individuals with schizophrenia make fewer positive 
facial expressions in response to positive film clips than normal controls; moreover, 
they make fewer negative facial expressions in response to negative film clips than 
controls (Kring & Neale, 1996). Further, they appear to have the greatest impairment 
expressing anger (Gottheil et al., 1970). Thus, individuals with schizophrenia appear to 
make expressions in response to affective stimuli but to an attenuated degree.  
Although they make fewer facial expressions, individuals with schizophrenia do 
appear to exhibit activity in the facial muscles associated with appropriate facial 
reactions to affective stimuli (Earnst et al., 1996; Kring et al., 1999). That is, like 
control participants, individuals with schizophrenia show greater activity in the muscles 
associated with frowning in response to negative pictures than in response to positive 
pictures (Kring et al., 1999). Moreover, individuals with schizophrenia tend to show the 
same pattern of facial responsivity in the muscles associated with frowning and smiling 
in response to happy, sad, fearful, and angry stimuli (Kring et al., 1999). Thus, it 
appears that individuals with schizophrenia are expressing appropriate facial 
expressions but to such an attenuated degree that they are not perceived.  
As mentioned, individuals with schizophrenia tend to have reduced involuntary 
emotional expressiveness, especially for positive emotions (Martin et al.,  1990). 
Additionally, individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate reduced facial activity when 
voluntarily attempting to mimic a facial expression (Gaebel & Wölwer, 1992; Tremeau 
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et al., 2005). Moreover, they are less accurate at generating facial expressions (Gottheil, 
Thornton, & Exline, 1976), both by verbal instruction and imitation (Borod et al., 1990; 
Schwartz, Mastropaolo, Rosse, Mathis, & Deutsch, 2006). When asked to imitate an 
emotional facial expression, individuals with schizophrenia show significantly worse 
performance than controls (Gaebel & Wölwer, 1992). They have the most pronounced 
deficit when attempting to imitate fearful, sad, and angry expressions (Gaebel & 
Wölwer, 1992; Tremeau et al., 2005); they have the least pronounced deficit when 
attempting to imitate happy and surprised expressions (Tremeau et al., 2005). Not only 
are individuals with schizophrenia less accurate at imitating facial expressions, they 
also give fewer emotional expressions on command and spend less time expressing 
those emotions (Tremeau et al., 2005). Similarly, they also demonstrate reduced facial 
activity when attempting to simulate emotions when the stimulus is an emotional word 
(e.g., fear) rather than an emotional facial expression (Gaebel & Wölwer, 1992; 
Tremeau et al., 2005). Therefore, it appears that they not only experience difficulty 
expressing emotions spontaneously, but they also experience difficulty expressing 
emotions voluntarily.  
These abnormalities of emotion expression in schizophrenia may be influenced 
by emotion perception deficits (Sachs, Steger-Wuchse, Kryspin-Exner, Gur, & 
Katschnig, 2004). Individuals with poorer performance on emotion perception measures 
tend to have greater affective flattening (Kohler et al., 2003). However, other research 
indicates that these processes are independent (Kring & Neale, 1996; Silver & Shlomo, 
2001). For example, emotion perception performance was significantly positively 
correlated with negative symptoms such as affective flattening in one study, but this 
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correlation was no longer significant when age, length of illness, accumulated time in 
the hospital, or education were added as a covariate (Silver, Shlomo, Turner, & Gur, 
2002). This suggests that the relationship between emotion perception and emotional 
expression may be complicated and deserving of further empirical attention. 
Emotion Regulation 
This emotion paradox, the disjunction between the experience and the 
expression of emotion in schizophrenia, may reflect difficulties in emotion regulation. 
That is, the impaired emotion perception, irregular emotional experience, and abnormal 
emotional expression observed in this population may be a result of poor skills with 
emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal or suppression. 
Indeed, individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate maladaptive coping with 
stress (Livingstone et al., 2009), and their chosen methods to regulate distress tend to be 
avoidant (e.g., suppression; van den Bosch, van Asma, Rombouts, & Louwerens, 1992). 
This preference for avoidant strategies like suppression is in contrast to the preference 
for reappraisal made by psychiatrically healthy individuals (Livingstone et al., 2009; 
van der Meer, van't Wout, & Aleman, 2009). Frequent use of suppression may help 
explain the emotion paradox, wherein suppression leads to an expression of flat affect 
that is incongruent with the emotional experience. Suppression may also help explain 
the finding of increased skin conductance in this population (van der Meer et al., 2009), 
as suppression leads to greater physiological reactivity than reappraisal. Thus, the 
choice of regulatory strategy may mediate the relationship between emotional 
experience and emotional expression.  
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Some research indicates that individuals with schizophrenia are able to suppress 
their feelings in response to emotional film clips but have difficulty amplifying their 
feelings (Henry et al., 2007). This suggests that it is easier for them to try to down-
regulate than to up-regulate their emotional experience. Moreover, it suggests that 
individuals with schizophrenia not only have a skill deficit (i.e., they do not have the 
skills to increase positive experiences) but also maladaptive use of intact skills (i.e., 
overreliance on suppression to decrease negative experiences; Kring & Werner, 2004). 
Interestingly, the film clips in this cited study were intended to elicit amusement. The 
relative ease with which individuals with schizophrenia were able to adopt the emotion 
regulation strategy of suppression to down-regulate positive feelings may relate to their 
increased reporting of anhedonia whereby they report diminished levels of pleasure in 
their emotional experience. 
Further, research indicates that affective flattening, an abnormality in emotional 
expression, may be a result of poor use of emotional suppression (Ellgring & Smith, 
1998). In other words, it has been argued that individuals presenting with flat affect 
may overuse emotional suppression as a regulatory strategy such that they do not 
appropriately connect their emotional expression with their emotional experience. The 
clinical significance of this poor emotion regulation is shown via the variety of negative 
consequences associated with persistent emotional suppression, including impairing 
memory, disrupting communication, inhibiting relationship formation, and reducing 
rapport (Butler et al.,  2003; John & Gross, 2004). Thus, the tendency to overuse the 
regulatory strategy of emotional suppression can not only lead to affective flattening 
but can also have negative social consequences for individuals with schizophrenia.  
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The neural circuitry associated with emotion processing also shows abnormalities 
in schizophrenia (Aleman & Khan, 2005; Brunet-Gouet & Decety, 2006). Generally, 
reduced activity in the appraisal regions (amygdala, insula, striatum, and medial 
orbitofrontal cortex) is associated with impairments in perception of and response to 
emotional stimuli in this population (Brunet-Gouet & Decety, 2006; Denny et al., 2010). 
However, the evidence supporting hypoactivations in these areas is equivocal (Brunet-
Gouet & Decety, 2006), as some studies report hyperactivations in these regions, 
particularly the amygdala (Holt et al., 2006; Kosaka et al., 2002). The interpretation of 
these data that is perhaps most consistent with all current reports is that serious mental 
illness involves impairments in emotion appraisal at multiple levels of biosystemic 
functioning, including the neurophysiological and neuropsychological levels. 
This dysregulation may be due, at least in part, to disrupted connections between 
the appraisal regions and the cognitive control (i.e., regulation) regions (Das et al., 2007). 
This is apparent even in individuals who are at risk for developing psychosis (Modinos, 
Ormel, & Aleman, 2010), indicating that it may be a marker of vulnerability for the 
disorder.  
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERVENTIONS TARGETING SOCIAL COGNITIVE DEFICITS 
The neuropathology associated with schizophrenia and the severity of the 
associated social cognitive deficits brings into question whether the emotion processing 
deficits associated with that pathology can be remediated. Several interventions have 
been developed to target the various systemic deficits associated with SMI. Although 
these treatments are far from returning individuals with SMI to “normal” functioning, 
preliminary data do indicate that these deficits are responsive to therapeutic remediation. 
Interventions Based on the Generalized Deficit Hypothesis 
To the degree that functional neurocognition is a prerequisite for success at any 
more molar level of processing (e.g., social cognition), strengthening basic 
neurocognition may lead to improvements in social cognition (Spaulding & Poland, 
2001).
2
 This is reflected in the generalized deficit hypothesis, that social cognitive deficits 
such as the poor emotion processing observed in schizophrenia are due primarily to 
cognitive impairment in general, not the failure of some specific cognitive or 
neurocognitive subsystem (Archer, Hay, & Young, 1992; Huang, Xu, & Chan, 2011; 
Johnston, Katsikitis, & Carr, 2001; Kerr & Neale, 1993; Mueser et al., 1996; Pomarol-
Clotet et al., 2010; Salem et al., 1996). This hypothesis also presumes that remediating 
cognitive impairment should likewise remediate emotion processing deficits (van der 
Gaag, Kern, van den Bosch, & Liberman, 2002). 
Indeed, cognitive remediation, a treatment program aimed at improving executive 
functioning deficits, is associated with improvements in social cognition. Cognitive 
remediation consists of exercises of varying cognitive complexity, from basic perception 
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to social perception. Although the goal of the program is to target social perception, 
neurocognitive skills such as attention, memory, and executive functioning are also 
targeted, as these skills are considered fundamental for improved social perception (van 
der Gaag et al., 2002). These areas are targeted with training in such strategies as self-
instruction, memory enhancement, inductive reasoning, and compensatory training 
procedures, strategies which have proven successful in remediating other types of deficits 
in schizophrenia (Kern, Wallace, Hellman, Womack, & Green, 1996).  
Consistent with its goal of remediating neurocognitive deficits, cognitive 
remediation is associated with improvements in verbal and visual memory, sustained 
attention, and executive functioning in schizophrenia (Hodge et al., 2010; Reeder, 
Newton, Frangou, & Wykes, 2004). Furthermore, it is associated with improvements in 
emotion perception in this population. Although individuals with schizophrenia commit 
35-55% more errors in emotion tasks than healthy controls before treatment, their 
performance approaches that of untreated healthy controls following treatment (van der 
Gaag et al., 2002).  
Finally, cognitive remediation is associated with improvements in social and 
occupational outcomes, which appear to persist in at least the short-term beyond the 
conclusion of treatment (Hodge et al., 2010). Importantly, it has been hypothesized that 
cognitive remediation serves as a mediator between changes in neurocognition and social 
functioning; without cognitive remediation, changes in neurocognition do not appear to 
affect social functioning (Reeder et al., 2004). 
A more comprehensive cognitive treatment modality is Integrated Psychological 
Therapy (IPT; Brenner, Hodel, Roder, & Corrigan, 1992; Roder, Mueller, Brenner, & 
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Spaulding, 2010). Like cognitive remediation, IPT is founded upon the assumption that 
both neurocognitive and social cognitive deficits need to be addressed therapeutically to 
effect change in social cognition (Brenner et al., 1992; Wallace et al., 1980). Also like 
cognitive remediation, IPT consists of exercises of varying cognitive complexity, from 
basic perception to social perception. These exercises are arranged in five hierarchical 
subprograms: cognitive differentiation, social perception, verbal communication, social 
skills, and interpersonal problem solving. With respect to neurocognitive deficits, IPT is 
associated with improvements in attention, concept formation, and abstract thinking, as 
well as in spatiotemporal orientation and memory (see Roder, Mueller, Mueser, & 
Brenner, 2006, for a review). IPT is also associated with improvements in social 
functioning and social competence (Brenner et al., 1992; Roder et al., 2006; Spaulding, 
Reed, Sullivan, Richardson, & Weiler, 1999; Zimmer, Duncan, Laitano, Ferreira, & 
Belmonte-de-Abreu, 2007).  
Interventions Based on the Specific Deficit Hypothesis 
Although the generalized deficit hypothesis proposes that deficits in emotion 
processing in schizophrenia may be due to general cognitive impairment, its competitor, 
the specific deficit hypothesis, proposes that these deficits may be due to a specific deficit 
in emotion processing that is independent of general cognitive impairment (Borod et al., 
1993; Edwards et al., 2001; Gaebel & Wölwer, 1992; Heimberg, Gur, Erwin, Shtasel, & 
Gur, 1992; Kosmidis et al., 2007; Poole et al., 2000; Shaw et al., 1999). Thus, the 
specific deficit hypothesis presumes that remediating emotion processing deficits will 
require a targeted intervention, as cognitive remediation may only result in slight 
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improvements in emotion processing (Bryson, Bell, & Lysaker, 1997; Wölwer et al.,  
2005). 
Several treatments have been developed aimed specifically at remediating 
emotion processing deficits. Penn and Combs (2000) randomly assigned inpatients with 
schizophrenia to one of four interventions to compare effects on ability to identify facial 
affect: repeated practice with facial emotion identification, monetary reinforcement for 
correct identifications, imitation of facial emotions (facial feedback), and a combination 
of monetary reinforcement and facial feedback. The latter three groups resulted in 
improvements in facial affect identification to a degree that was comparable to 
performance of untreated healthy controls (Penn & Combs,  2000). Consistent with these 
results, two other imitation-based modalities have benefits for improving emotion 
recognition, the accuracy of facial expressions, and social and behavioral functioning in 
schizophrenia (Mazza et al., 2010; Schwartz et al., 2006).  
The Micro-Expression Training Tool (METT; Russell, Chu, & Phillips, 2006) is a 
single-session computer-based intervention that attempts to improve emotion recognition. 
The program retrains where participants visually attend to faces, and pilot data indicate 
that it improves emotion recognition in outpatients with schizophrenia to a level 
comparable to untreated healthy controls.  
Training of Affect Recognition (TAR; Frommann, Streit, & Wölwer, 2003) is a 
modality similar to cognitive remediation and IPT in its emphasis on errorless learning 
strategies such as compensation and positive reinforcement. Results indicate that this 
program is associated with significant improvements in facial affect recognition and 
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discrimination, to a degree comparable to that of untreated healthy controls (Frommann 
et al., 2003; Habel et al., 2010; Wölwer et al., 2005).  
Emotion-Focused Therapy (Greenberg, 2004; Greenberg & Bolger, 2001), 
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), and Emotional Management 
Training (Hodel & Brenner, 2002) are perhaps the treatments most aimed at developing 
emotion regulation skills. These modalities are designed to develop an understanding of 
adaptive and maladaptive emotions and their sources and then acquire emotion regulation 
skills. Emotion-Focused Therapy and DBT were not developed for schizophrenia, but the 
therapeutic goals and skills of both modalities are consistent with deficits observed in 
schizophrenia. Thus, these modalities may be useful for helping individuals with 
schizophrenia develop more adaptive emotion regulation skills (van der Meer et al., 
2009). In contrast, Emotional Management Training, a subprogram of IPT, was designed 
specifically for emotion processing deficits observed in schizophrenia (Hodel & Brenner, 
1997). This modality leads to improvements in emotional information processing and 
cognitive processing in this population, beyond what is observed for other common 
treatments (Hodel & Brenner, 2002).  
Finally, Social Cognition and Interaction Training (SCIT; Penn, Roberts, Combs, 
& Sterne, 2007) is a group-based treatment modality aimed specifically at remediating 
social cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. It targets the three key social cognitive deficits 
in this population: emotion perception, attributional style, and theory of mind. It appears 
to be effective in inpatients (Combs et al., 2007; Penn et al., 2007) and outpatients 
(Roberts & Penn, 2009; Kleinlein, 2010) at remediating deficits in emotion processing 
and improving social functioning. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PRESENT STUDY 
This review has evaluated the abnormalities in emotion processing observed in 
schizophrenia. The research on emotion perception clearly demonstrates a deficit in that 
domain:  Individuals with schizophrenia are impaired at recognizing the emotional 
expressions in faces, voices, and integrated tasks. However, the research for emotional 
experience and expression are substantially less clear. Although individuals with 
schizophrenia self-report similar emotional experiences to controls, physiological and 
experience sampling data indicate their actual experiences may conflict with these 
reports. This discrepancy points to the possibility that individuals with schizophrenia 
may be using emotion regulation strategies to alter their perception of their emotional 
experiences, thereby perceiving their abnormal experience as near normal. Finally, 
although individuals with schizophrenia frequently present with flattened affect, data 
indicate subtle movement in facial regions associated with appropriate emotional 
expressions. This again raises the possibility that emotion regulation strategies, such as 
suppression, may help explain this observation.  
This study further elucidates the relationships between emotion regulation, 
biosystemic domains, and treatment modalities in SMI. The importance of understanding 
social cognitive functioning, and particularly emotion regulation, in SMI lies in its 
relationship to other biosystemic domains, including social and community functioning. 
Furthermore, contradictory findings and methodological differences across studies have 
limited conclusions that can be drawn about these relationships.  
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The first aim of this study is to evaluate the interrelationships between emotion 
processing and psychiatric symptoms. It is hypothesized that more severe positive 
symptoms of psychosis will be associated with greater use of suppression as a 
regulatory strategy (Hypothesis 1). As discussed, suppression is generally associated 
with the experience of more psychiatric symptoms and reappraisal with fewer (Gross & 
John, 2003); and this has been replicated in schizophrenia (Henry, Rendell, Green, 
McDonald, & O'Donnell, 2008). Positive symptoms of schizophrenia, such as auditory 
hallucinations and paranoid delusions, are associated with increases in the emotional 
experience of anxiety and depression (Freeman, 2007; Lysaker & Salyers, 2007). 
Emotional experiences such as these are typically down-regulated (John & Gross, 2009) 
with regulatory strategies such as suppression or reappraisal. This has been replicated in 
schizophrenia, whereby the severity of auditory hallucinations has been demonstrated 
to be associated with greater use of suppression (Badcock, Paulik, & Maybery, 2011).  
The second aim of this study is to evaluate the interrelationships between 
emotion processing and neurocognition. It is hypothesized that individuals with better 
emotion regulation will have higher scores on neurocognitive assessments of attention, 
memory, and executive functioning (Hypothesis 2). Just as any other type of cognitive 
processing, emotion processing requires neural resources. At the most basic level, 
appraisal of perceived emotional stimuli requires attention to those stimuli. Moreover, 
online interpretations of emotional stimuli require intact working memory (Green & 
Malhi, 2006). Finally, reinterpretations of these stimuli and self-regulation require 
higher order cognitive abilities, such as long-term memory and especially executive 
functioning (Declerck, Boone, & De Brabander, 2006; Gyurak et al., 2009). Executive 
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functioning appears to be particularly important for regulating emotions during times of 
distress. However, there are discrepant results regarding whether this is also the case in 
schizophrenia (Bak et al., 2008; Penn et al., 1993). Limitations in neurocognitive 
resources would likely have a greater negative effect on individuals who habitually 
suppress (such as the schizophrenia population) than those who reappraise because 
suppression requires more cognitive resources (Badcock et al., 2011).  
The third aim of this study is to evaluate the interrelationships between emotion 
processing and social functioning. It is hypothesized that individuals with better 
emotion regulation will have higher scores on assessments of social and community 
functioning (Hypothesis 3a). Habitual use of suppression is associated with greater 
social functioning difficulties in schizophrenia as compared to habitual use of 
reappraisal (Badcock et al., 2011; Henry et al., 2008). It is further hypothesized that the 
relationship between emotion regulation and social and community functioning will 
interact with severity of positive psychotic symptoms (Hypothesis 3b). Cognitive 
deficits limit the neural resources available for allocation toward self-regulation, social 
perception, and attention to external stimuli (Ellgring & Smith, 1998), and this may 
have negative social consequences. Greater focus on internal stimuli, such as positive 
psychotic symptoms, may further limit the resources available for attention to external 
stimuli and thereby compromise social functioning.  
The fourth aim of this study is to evaluate the interrelationships between 
emotion processing and treatment history. It is hypothesized that individuals who have 
completed group treatment modalities will have better emotion regulation (Hypothesis 
4a). More specifically, it is hypothesized that individuals who have completed a group 
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treatment modality based on the specific deficit hypothesis (e.g., SCIT) will have better 
emotion regulation than individuals who have completed a group treatment modality 
based on the generalized deficit hypothesis (e.g., IPT) (Hypothesis 4b). As discussed, 
treatment modalities have been developed for the purpose of remediating social 
cognitive and emotion processing deficits in SMI. Of particular interest is the effect of 
“jumping to conclusions” on emotion processing. Individuals who have experienced 
psychosis are more likely to jump to conclusions, basing conclusions on limited 
evidence (Dudley, John, Young, & Over, 1997a, 1997b). Moreover, jumping to 
conclusions is associated with feelings of anxiety, and anxiety with an increase in 
paranoia (Lincoln, Lange, Burau, Exner, & Moritz, 2010). However, when given more 
information on which to base conclusions, individuals who have experienced psychosis 
can change their conclusions (Dudley et al., 1997a, 1997b). The finding that jumping to 
conclusions may be related to emotion regulation strategies (Livingstone et al., 2009), 
suggests that modalities aimed at teaching individuals how to evaluate evidence and 
avoid jumping to conclusions may impact which strategies these individuals use to 
regulate emotions. 
Finally, this study aims to summarize the hypothesized relationships with a path 
model. It is hypothesized that emotion regulation can be incorporated in pathways to 
clinical outcome, consistent with pathways previously observed in the SMI population 
(Hypothesis 5). Previous research has identified pathways to functional outcome in 
schizophrenia, but none have incorporated emotion regulation. For example, Brekke et 
al. (2005) established the pathway from neurocognition to global functional outcome 
via emotion perception. Their results are presented graphically in Figure 5.1.  
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Figure 5.1.  
Pathway from Neurocognition to Global Functional Outcome from Brekke et al., 2005 
Neurocognition was measured by a composite composed of performance on the Controlled Oral Word 
Association Test, the Digit Span Distractibility Test, the Degraded-Stimulus Continuous Performance 
Test, and perseverative errors from the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test. 
Emotion perception was measured by a composite composed of performance on the Facial Emotion 
Identification Test, the Videotape Affect Perception Test, and the Voice Emotion Identification Test.  
Social competence was measured by a subscale of the Community Adjustment Form. 
Social support was measured by a self-report social support scale adapted from the Medical Outcomes 
Study Social Support Survey. 
Global Functional Outcome was measured from the Role Functioning Scale and included ratings of work, 
social functioning, and independent living.  
 
 
In addition, Lipkovich et al. (2009) established the pathway from 
neurocognition to occupational functioning via symptom severity. Their results are 
presented graphically in Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2.  
Pathway from Neurocognition to Occupational Functioning from Lipkovich et al., 2009 
Working memory was measured by the Letter-Number Sequencing verbal subtest of the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale Third Edition.  
Processing speed was measured by the average of the WAIS-R Digit-Symbol Coding performance subtest 
and the Category Instances, and Controlled Oral Word Association Test. 
Verbal memory was measured by the Rey Auditory-Verbal Learning Test with Crawford Alternative. 
Positive and negative symptoms were measured with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. 
Occupational functioning was measured with the Quality of Life Scale Instrumental Role Functioning 
subdomain.  
 
Inclusion of emotional regulation considerations with these known pathways, 
and the hypotheses proposed in this study, produces the hypothesized path model 
described in Figure 5.3. The hypothesized model adapts the results from Brekke et al. 
(2005) and Lipkovich et al. (2009) to pathways from neurocognition to social 
functioning via emotion perception and symptom severity. Neurocognition is also 
expected to predict emotion regulation, following from Hypothesis 2. The path from 
emotion regulation to social functioning follows from Hypothesis 3, and the path from 
self-harm to emotion regulation is based on the theory that self-harm is a behavioral 
Direct effect (β), p < .05 
Direct effect (β), p > .05 
Residual (Endogenous) Variance (  
 ) 
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proxy of emotion dysregulation. Finally, the pathways from group skills training 
participation to emotion perception and social functioning follow from Hypothesis 4 
and the hypothesized effects of modalities such as SCIT and IPT on these constructs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Hypothesized Path Model 
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CHAPTER 6 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were recruited from the clients of a local day rehabilitation center 
serving adults with SMI. Clients of this day rehabilitation center regularly participate in 
rehabilitative group treatment modalities, including IPT and SCIT. The sample included 
42 individuals who collectively are fairly representative of the larger SMI population 
with respect to psychiatric diagnoses, gender and age distribution, and other demographic 
and clinical characteristics. One participant was excluded from the analyses, as detailed 
below. Diagnoses were determined by reviewing participants’ clinical records, and all 
diagnoses were made by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist. All participants had 
primary Axis I diagnoses of schizophrenia spectrum disorders (78.1%), Bipolar I 
Disorder (12.2%), or Major Depressive Disorder (7.3%), and many had secondary Axis I 
and Axis II disorders. One exclusion criterion was a primary diagnosis of Borderline 
Personality Disorder. This is primarily a disorder of maladaptive emotion regulation, and 
the difficulties of individuals with this diagnosis may not be reflective of the difficulties 
and experiences of the larger SMI population. Participants in the final sample of 41 
individuals (32 males, 9 females) included 37 Caucasians, 2 African Americans, and 2 of 
another race or ethnicity, with an age range of 21 to 70 years (M = 43.6 years; SD = 13.7 
years) and education of 10 to 16 years (M = 12.2 years; SD = 1.5 years). Most 
participants were prescribed antipsychotic medications (85.4%) in addition to other 
psychotropic medications. Additional demographic and clinical characteristics of the 
sample are included in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1. Sample Demographic and Clinical Characteristics 
 Variable n %  
 Sex    
  Male 32 78.0  
  Female 9 22.0  
 Ethnicity    
  Caucasian 37 90.2  
  African American 2 4.9  
  Other 2 4.8  
 Marital Status    
  Single 33 80.5  
  Divorced 6 14.6  
 Legal Status at Admission    
  Voluntary 18 43.9  
  Voluntary by Guardian 1 2.4  
  Mental Health Board Commitment 5 12.2  
  Court Order  1 2.4  
  Not Responsible by Reason of Insanity 3 7.3  
 Axis I Diagnosis    
  Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type 12 29.3  
  Schizophrenia, Disorganized or Undifferentiated Type 5 12.2  
  Schizoaffective Disorder 15 36.6  
  Bipolar I Disorder 5 12.2  
  Major Depressive Disorder 3 7.3  
  Missing 1 2.4  
 Second Axis I Diagnosis    
  Paraphilia  Disorder 2 4.9  
  Substance Abuse/Dependence (In Remission) 5 12.2  
  Anxiety Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified 4 9.8  
  Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 2 4.9  
  Other (Cognitive Disorder due to Head Injury; Attention 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder; Asperger’s Disorder; 
Obsessive Compulsive Disorder) 4 9.8 
 
   
  No Diagnosis/Missing 24 58.5  
 Third Axis I Diagnosis    
  Depressive Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified 2 4.9  
 
 
Other (Substance Abuse/Dependence; Cognitive Disorder, 
Not Otherwise Specified; Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder; 
Intermittent Explosive Disorder; Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder) 5 12.2 
 
  No Diagnosis/Missing 34 82.9  
 Axis II Diagnosis    
  Personality Disorder, NOS 3 7.3  
  Borderline Intellectual Functioning 2 4.9  
  No Diagnosis/Deferred/Missing 36 87.8  
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 Variable n %  
 Medications    
  Antipsychotic 35 85.4  
  Anticonvulsant/Mood Stabilizer/Lithium 21 50.4  
  Antidepressant 18 43.9  
  Anxiolytic  12 29.3  
  Addiction 2 4.9  
  Levothyroxine 2 4.9  
  Stimulant 1 2.4  
 
Measures 
The following measures comprise the battery of instruments included in the study. 
Clinical instruments.  
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Ventura et al., 1993). The Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) is a semi-structured interview that rates the presence of 
24 psychiatric symptoms over the previous two weeks. The severity of each symptom is 
rated on a scale from (1) not present to (7) extremely severe. Previous factor analyses 
have demonstrated that a four factor solution consisting of Thought Disorder (e.g., 
grandiosity, suspiciousness, hallucinations, unusual thought content), Anergia (motor 
retardation, uncooperativeness, blunted affect), Affect (somatic concern, anxiety, guilt, 
depression, hostility), and Disorganization (conceptual disorganization, tension, odd 
mannerisms and posturing) fits BPRS data well (Mueser, Curran, & McHugo, 1997; 
Long & Brekke, 1999). Total scores range from 24 to 168, with higher scores reflecting 
greater symptom severity.  
Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory (DSHI; Gratz, 2001). The Deliberate Self-Harm 
Inventory (DSHI) is a 17-item self-report questionnaire to assess deliberate self-harm. 
Each item asks participants to indicate whether they have engaged in a particular type of 
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self-harm and follows affirmative responses with questions about frequency, severity, and 
duration of harm. This measure will serve as a functional indicator of difficulties with 
emotion regulation. 
In undergraduates, the overall internal consistency (α) is .82. Item-total 
correlations (r) range from .12 to .65. Test-retest reliability is adequate (ϕ = .68,  p 
<.001). Scores correlate with other measures of self-harm, history of suicide attempts, 
social desirability, and history of psychotherapy. 
Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale (RACERS; Bottoms, 
2011). The Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale (RACERS) is a 30-item 
self-report measure of emotion regulation developed collaboratively with participants at a 
day rehabilitation center. This new instrument was designed to measure aspects of 
emotion regulation maximally pertinent to the particular difficulties in this domain 
associated with SMI. Preliminary psychometric analyses indicate that RACERS has 
adequate construct validity and internal consistency (α = .77). Scores range from 30 to 
180, with higher scores reflecting better emotion regulation. 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) is a 36-item self-report measure of 
difficulties with emotion regulation. Participants rate how often the items describe their 
emotional and behavioral responses to being upset. Each item is rated on a Likert-type 
scale ranging from (1) almost never to (5) almost always. Items are arranged into 6 
subscales: Nonacceptance of Emotional Responses; Difficulties Engaging in Goal-
Directed Behavior; Impulse Control Difficulties; Lack of Emotional Awareness; Limited 
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Access to Emotion Regulation Strategies; and Lack of Emotional Clarity. Scores range 
from 36 to 180, with higher scores reflecting greater emotion dysregulation. 
In undergraduates, the overall internal consistency (α) is .93, ranging from .80 to 
.89 on subscales. Item-total correlations (r) range from .16 to .69. 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003). The Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ) is a 10-item self-report questionnaire designed to 
measure the habitual use of suppression and reappraisal. Each item describes a way of 
controlling particular emotions and is rated on a 7-point Likert scale from (1) strongly 
agree to (7) strongly agree. Reappraisal scores range from 6 to 42, and suppression scores 
range from 4 to 28, with higher scores representing greater use of that regulatory strategy. 
No total score is obtained, as the reappraisal and suppression factors are considered 
independent.  
In undergraduates, the internal consistency (α) for Reappraisal is .79 and for 
Suppression is .73. Test-retest reliability is .69 for both scales. 
Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ; Vorst & Bermond, 2001). 
The Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ) is a 40-item self-report 
questionnaire that assesses alexithymia, or a deficiency in the ability to recognize, 
identify, and distinguish between emotional states. Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale from (1) strongly agree to (5) strongly disagree. The items are divided into five 
subscales in two domains. In the Cognitive domain are the following subscales:  
Identifying (degree of ability to describe the nature of one’s own emotions); Analyzing 
(degree to which one tries to explain personal emotional states); and Verbalizing (degree 
to which one is able to verbally communicate about emotional states). In the Affective 
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domain are the following subscales: Emotionalizing (degree of arousal from emotional 
stimuli); and Fantasizing (degree of likelihood to fantasize about virtual matters). Scores 
range from 40 to 200, with higher scores reflecting greater alexithymia. The overall 
internal consistency (α) is .81 in undergraduates, ranging from .67 to .85 on subscales. 
Neurocognition.  
The Neuropsychological Assessment Battery – Screening Module (Stern & 
White, 2003). The Neuropsychological Assessment Battery – Screening Module (NAB-
S) is designed to evaluate the neuropsychological functioning of adults aged 18 to 97 who 
have disorders affecting the central nervous system. As such, it is particularly useful for 
individuals with SMI, who demonstrate aberrant neurological functioning as reviewed 
above. The Screening Module briefly screens for impairment in each of five 
neuropsychological domains: Attention, Language, Memory, Spatial Ability, and 
Executive Functions. The internal consistency (α) of the NAB-S ranges from .24 to .79. 
The reliability (G) of the NAB-S ranges from .55 to .91, with an overall reliability of .80. 
Trail Making Test - Trails A and B (Reitan & Davidson, 1974). The Trail 
Making Test (TMT) is a visual search test to assess brain dysfunction and rehabilitative 
progress in individuals between the ages of 15 and 89 (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 
2006). The test is given in two parts, Trails A and Trails B. On Trails A, participants are 
asked to connect a series of 25 numbered circles in numerical order as quickly as 
possible; on Trails B, they are asked to connect a series of 25 numbered and lettered 
circles by alternating the numerical and alphabetical sequences (e.g., connect 1 to A to 2 
to B, etc.) as quickly as possible. Generally, the test measures attention, psychomotor 
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processing speed, and mental flexibility. Scores reflect the time required to complete each 
part; higher scores reflect slower time to completion. 
Reliability of the TMT in individuals with schizophrenia is quite low (α = .36 for 
Trails A and α = .63 for Trails B). Nevertheless, performance on the TMT is associated 
with vocational outcome, psychosocial outcome, performance of independent living skills 
and thus demonstrates substantial utility in this population. 
Social cognition. 
Face Emotion Identification Task ( Kerr and Neale, 1993). The Face Emotion 
Identification Task (FEIT) is a computer-based task developed to measure emotion 
recognition in schizophrenia. Participants are shown 19 photographs from Izard (1971) 
and Ekman (1976), representing happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and shame. 
After each photograph, they are asked to identify the present emotion from six choices 
corresponding to the emotions included in the pictures. The task has an internal 
consistency (α) of .71 in schizophrenia.  
Benton Facial Recognition Test (Benton, Hamsher, Varney, & Spreen, 1983). 
The Benton Facial Recognition Test (BFRT) measures the ability to recognize unfamiliar 
faces and is an assessment of perceptual discrimination. Participants are shown a target 
face and are asked to match that face to other photographs. The first 6 trials consist of 
straightforward matching of the target to one of six other faces; and the final 16 trials 
consist of matching the target to three of six faces with altered lighting or orientation. 
Scores range from 0 to 54, with higher scores reflecting greater perceptual discrimination. 
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Social functioning.  
Social Functioning Scale (Birchwood, Smith, Cochrane, Wetton, & Copestacke, 
1990). The Social Functioning Scale (SFS) is a measure of social functioning to assess 
the efficacy of treatment for schizophrenia. The scale measures skills and behaviors 
relevant to the impairments of this population. Items are grouped into 7 subscales: Social 
engagement, Interpersonal behavior, Prosocial activities, Recreation, Independence-
Competence (ability to perform independent living skills), Independence-Performance 
(performance of independent living skills), and Employment/Occupation. Scores range 
from 0 to 223, with higher scores reflecting better social functioning. 
The SFS has good reliability and validity in a sample of individuals with 
schizophrenia. The overall inter-rater reliability is .94, ranging from .69 to .96 on 
subscales. The overall scale has an internal consistency (α) of .80, ranging from .69 to .87 
on subscales. SFS scores are related to symptom presentation, prosocial behaviors, 
employment, and performance independent living skills. 
Multnomah Community Ability Scale (Barker, Barron, McFarland, & Bigelow, 
1994). The Multnomah Community Ability Scale (MCAS) is a functional assessment 
instrument designed specifically for measuring community functioning in individuals 
with severe and persistent mental illness living in the community. The original version is 
intended for clinician completion (most often, case managers) regarding their clients’ 
functioning over the past 30 days; the self-report version (MCAS-SR; Barker, 
McFarland, & O’Malia, 2004) is intended for consumer completion. The scale includes 
17 items covering a range of community abilities in 4 domains: Health, Adaptation, 
Social Skills, and Behavior. Each item is rated on a 5-point Likert scale; descriptive 
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anchors vary for each item, but higher ratings reflect greater community functioning. 
Scores range from 17 to 85, with higher scores reflecting greater community functioning. 
The MCAS has good reliability and validity in large community-based SMI 
populations (Barker et al., 1994; Hendryx, Dyck, McBride, & Whitbeck, 2001; Trauer, 
2001; Zani, McFarland, Wachal, Barker, & Barron, 1999). The overall inter-rater 
reliability is .85, ranging from .32 to .75 on individual items and from .70 to .78 on 
subscales. The overall test-retest reliability is .83, ranging from .31 to .90 on individual 
items and from .70 to .82 on subscales. The items appear to be measuring the same 
construct, as the internal consistency is high (α = .90).  
Treatment. Participants’ completion of IPT and SCIT at the day rehabilitation 
center will be obtained from their clinical records. 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited at regular community meetings at a local day 
rehabilitation center. After a participant expressed interest in the study, the experimental 
purpose, procedures, risks and benefits were fully explained, and written informed 
consent was obtained. For participants with legal guardians, guardian consent was 
obtained before participant assent was obtained.  
Participants were asked to complete a battery of measures administered by the 
author. In total, the battery of self-report and researcher-administered instruments took 
approximately 3 hours to complete. Most participants completed the battery in one to 
three sessions over two weeks, depending on individual preferences and fatigue. Two 
participants did not complete the entire battery, as one was hospitalized before 
completion of the study and one chose to withdraw from the study. These participants are 
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included in the analyses for the completed portions of the battery. Participants were 
compensated $20 for completing the study. 
Demographic, clinical, and treatment information was retrieved from treatment 
records. All data was compiled into a de-identified database for analysis.  
Statistical Analyses 
Path analyses were conducted in Mplus. Mplus allows for specification of 
simultaneous regression equations and therefore implies a very specific covariance matrix 
that better approximates the data than sequential regression equations. Beginning with the 
hypothesized model, each model specified endogenous (dependent) and exogenous 
(independent) variables and the covariance between them. Estimated models were 
evaluated by ensuring that the algorithm converged. Converged models were modified 
according to theoretical guidance, beginning by examining the normalized residual 
covariance matrix and individually removing parameters with abnormally large standard 
errors. Next, parameters with abnormally large modification indices were removed 
individually, again according to theoretical guidance. Then, model fit statistics were used 
to evaluate the overall model fit. These included the log-likelihood from the tested model; 
the log-likelihood of the saturated (unstructured) model in which all variances, 
covariances, and means are estimated; the Akaike Information Criterion; the Bayesian 
Information Criterion; the Chi-Square Test of Model Fit; the Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation; the Comparative Fit Index; the Tucker Lewis Index; and the 
Standardized Root Mean Squared Residual. If the estimated model did not have adequate 
fit, the model parameters were evaluated, and those with non-significant p-values were 
removed individually. Effect on the model fit was assessed, and those non-significant 
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parameters that improved model fit when removed were excluded from the model. The 
model was considered complete when it contained a converged algorithm, stable standard 
errors, and adequate model fit.  
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CHAPTER 7 
RESULTS 
Preliminary Analyses 
Mean scores for each of the instruments included in the battery are included in 
Table 7.1, and the correlation matrices are included in Appendices A – C. Total scores for 
the Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory were not obtained because many participants with a 
history of chronic self-harm could not estimate the frequency of this behavior. Therefore, 
this instrument was used to categorize participants into two groups: Those with a history 
of self-harm and those with no history of self-harm. Results indicated that 21 participants 
reported no history of self-harm. Of the 18 participants who indicated a history of self-
harm, 8 reported having injured themselves fewer than 6 times, and the remaining 10 
individuals had more chronic histories of self-harm.  
Table 7.1. Assessment Descriptive Statistics 
Instrument n Scale Range M SE SD 
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale 40 24-168 43.20 1.47 9.31 
 Thought Disorder Factor 39 3.23-16.32 5.73 0.39 2.41 
 Anergia Factor 40 2.33-16.32 5.58 0.29 1.80 
 Affect Factor 40 2.28-15.97 5.87 0.47 2.96 
 Disorganization Factor 40 1.27-8.88 1.94 0.15 0.92 
Researcher & Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale 39 30-180 108.35 2.55 15.95 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale      
 Nonacceptance 38 6-30 14.92 1.05 6.47 
 Goals 38 5-25 13.24 0.72 4.44 
 Awareness 38 6-30 15.47 0.77 4.75 
 Strategies 38 8-40 18.08 1.25 7.69 
 Clarity 38 5-25 11.55 0.66 4.04 
 Impulse 38 6-30 12.21 0.79 4.88 
 Total 38 36-180 85.47 3.89 23.95 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire      
 Reappraisal 38 6-42 28.97 1.12 6.88 
 Suppression 38 4-28 16.45 0.74 4.58 
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Instrument n Scale Range M SE SD 
Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire      
 Cognitive Domain 41 24-120 65.54 2.01 12.85 
        Verbalizing 41 8-40 25.42 1.12 7.16 
        Identifying 41 8-40 20.83 1.00 6.40 
        Analyzing 41 8-40 19.29 0.70 4.46 
 Affective Domain 41 16-80 45.22 1.46 9.33 
        Emotionalizing 41 8-40 22.44 0.71 4.52 
        Fantasizing 41 8-40 22.78 1.09 6.98 
 Total 41 40-200 110.76 2.33 14.89 
Neuropsychological Assessment Battery – Screener (Standard Scores) 
 Attention 41  72.73 2.59 16.59 
 Language 41  100.49 3.10 19.82 
 Memory 41  80.63 2.58 16.49 
 Spatial Ability 41  89.10 2.79 17.86 
 Executive Functioning 41  88.15 2.39 15.32 
 Total 41  79.88 2.65 16.95 
Trail Making Test      
 Trails A 41  44.17 3.35 21.46 
 Trails B 34  98.65 7.56 44.06 
Facial Emotion Identification Task      
 Proportion Correctly Identified - Overall 41 0-1 0.56 0.03 0.21 
 Happy 41 0-1 0.85 0.05 0.30 
 Sad 41 0-1 0.50 0.06 0.38 
 Angry 41 0-1 0.64 0.05 0.33 
 Ashamed 41 0-1 0.34 0.05 0.30 
 Afraid 41 0-1 0.46 0.04 0.26 
 Surprised 41 0-1 0.76 0.05 0.32 
Benton Facial Recognition Test 41 0-54 40.95 0.94 6.00 
Social Functioning Scale      
 Social Engagement 38 0-15 10.66 0.38 2.35 
 Interpersonal Behavior 38 0-9 6.97 0.29 1.76 
 Prosocial Activities 38 0-39 17.18 1.52 9.36 
 Recreation 38 0-45 19.08 0.80 4.96 
 Independence – Competence 38 0-66 34.29 1.00 6.17 
 Independence – Performance 38 0-39 29.26 1.01 6.21 
 Employment/Occupation 38 0-10 5.45 0.54 3.36 
 Total 38 0-223 122.89 2.82 17.41 
Multnomah Community Ability Scale    
 Health 38 5-25 19.34 0.52 3.35 
 Adaptation 38 3-15 11.37 0.40 2.57 
 Social Skills 38 5-25 17.98 0.64 4.12 
 Behavior 38 4-20 18.05 0.37 2.40 
 Total 38 17-85 66.73 1.47 9.41 
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Instrument n Scale Range M SE SD 
Multnomah Community Ability Scale – Self Report    
 Health 38 5-25 18.71 0.61 3.74 
 Adaptation 38 3-15 11.21 0.35 2.17 
 Social Skills 38 5-25 18.03 0.63 3.87 
 Behavior 38 4-20 18.34 0.29 1.77 
 Total 38 17-85 66.29 1.39 8.58 
Social Cognition and Interaction Training      
 Participated 14     
 Not Participated 25     
 Progress Rating (Maximum) 14 0-10 8.36 0.37 1.39 
Integrated Psychological Therapy      
 Participated 24     
 Not Participated 15     
 Progress Rating (Average) 24 0-10 6.66 0.26 1.29 
 
Total scores were analyzed for each of the 15 instruments administered. Outliers 
were considered total scores greater than 2.5 standard deviations from the grand mean. 
The population under investigation is in part defined by departure from the mean. 
Consistent with this idea, 12 participants (29%) had an outlying score on one instrument, 
and 1 additional participant had outlying scores on three instruments. Given that 29% of 
the participants had an outlying score on one instrument in the data set, this pattern of 
responding was considered normative for the population being studied and the scores 
were not removed. An exception is a score on Trails B that was more than 4 standard 
deviations from the mean; this score was removed from the data set. The participant with 
three outlying scores was removed from the data set entirely for having multiple outlying 
scores and not representing the larger population.  
Performance on the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale indicates participants’ 
symptoms were generally in the “not present” to “very mild” range (average item score = 
1.81, SD = 0.40 on scale from 1 to 7). Symptoms related to affective flattening were the 
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most severe, in the “very mild” to “mild” range on average (average item score = 2.47, 
SD = 1.18), followed by symptoms related to anergia (average item score = 2.38, SD = 
0.77). Positive symptoms of psychosis and symptoms of disorganization were the least 
severe on average (Thought disorder average item score = 1.82, SD = 0.76; 
Disorganization average item score = 1.62, SD = 0.68).  
Participants with a diagnosis of an affective disorder (i.e., Schizoaffective 
Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, or Major Depressive Disorder) had more severe psychiatric 
symptoms (M = 45.75, SD = 9.46) than participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
(i.e., Schizophrenia Paranoid Type, Disorganized Type, or Undifferentiated Type) (M = 
39.87, SD = 7.90) to a degree approaching clinical significance, t(37) = 2.01, p = .052 . 
There were no significant differences between the groups on severity of positive 
symptoms [t(36) = 1.63, p = .112], affective symptoms [t(37) = 1.67, p = .103], or 
disorganization [t(37) = 1.04, p = .307]. However, participants with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia had significantly more severe symptoms of anergia, t(37) = 2.28, p = .029.  
Performance on the Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale  
indicated emotion regulation abilities were in about the average range. The grand mean 
was 108.35 (SD = 15.95), and scores on this instrument range from 30 to 180, with higher 
scores reflecting greater emotion regulation. There were no significant differences across 
diagnostic categories on this instrument, t < 1. 
The grand mean on the Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale was 84.47 (SD 
= 23.95), and scores on this instrument range from 36 to 180, with higher scores 
reflecting more difficulties with emotion regulation. Overall, scores were comparable to 
those received by patients with schizophrenia in other studies (e.g., Westermann & 
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Lincoln, 2011). On a 5-point scale (1 = almost never use this strategy; 5 = almost always 
use this strategy), average item scores ranged from 2.04 (SD = 0.81) on the Impulse 
Control subscale to 2.98 (SD = 1.29) on the Nonacceptance of Emotions subscale. This 
indicated that participants had difficulty with regulating emotions “sometimes” to “about 
half the time.”   
Participants with a diagnosis of an affective disorder had more difficulties with 
emotion regulation (M = 92.36, SD = 26.31) than participants with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia (M = 78.13, SD = 14.92) to a degree approaching clinical significance, 
t(35) = 1.89, p = .067 . Participants with a diagnosis of an affective disorder had 
significantly more difficulties than participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia with 
Acceptance of Emotional Responses [t(35) = 2.17, p = .037] and Engaging in Goal-
Directed Behavior [t(35) = 2.36, p = .024]. There were no significant differences across 
diagnostic categories on the remaining subscales (Impulse Control Difficulties; Lack of 
Emotional Awareness; Limited Access to Emotion Regulation Strategies; and Lack of 
Emotional Clarity). 
Performance on the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire indicated that participants 
tended to slightly agree that they used both suppression and reappraisal as emotion 
regulation strategies. On a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree to using the strategy; 7 = 
strongly agree to using the strategy), participants rated their use of reappraisal strategies 
on average a 4.83 (SD = 1.15) and their use of suppression strategies on average a 4.11 
(SD = 1.14). These results are consistent with previous research (e.g., Livingstone et al., 
2009). The sample agreed to using reappraisal more than they agreed to using 
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suppression, t(37) = 3.52, p = .001. There were no significant differences across 
diagnostic categories on this instrument, t < 1. 
The grand mean on the Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire was 110.76 
(SD = 14.89), and scores on this instrument range from 40 to 200, with higher scores 
reflecting greater alexithymia. Overall, scores were comparable to those received by 
patients with schizophrenia in other studies (e.g., van’t Wout et al., 2007). On a 5-point 
scale (1 = This definitely applies; 5 = This in no way applies), participants rated equally 
the affective and cognitive factors. The affective factor describes the degree to which one 
tries to explain personal emotional states, degree of ability to describe the nature of one’s 
own emotions, and degree of ability to verbally communicate about emotional states, and 
participants rated these items on average a 2.83 (SD = 0.58). The cognitive factor 
describes the degree of arousal from emotional stimuli and degree of likelihood to 
fantasize about virtual matters, and participants rated these items on average a 2.73 (SD = 
0.54). There were no significant differences across diagnostic categories in degree of 
alexithymia (t < 1). However, participants with a diagnosis of an affective disorder had 
significantly more difficulty verbally communicating about emotional states (M = 27.44, 
SD = 7.27) than participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (M = 23.13, SD = 4.85), 
t(38) = 2.03, p = .049 .  
The standard scores for the Neuropsychological Assessment Battery – Screener 
indicate that participants scored 1.34 standard deviations below average (age- and 
education-matched controls) on the total battery. Whereas their performance was average 
in the Language domain, performance was most impaired in all other domains, with the 
greatest impairment in the Attention domain (1.82 standard deviations below average). 
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Participants with a diagnosis of an affective disorder had higher scores on the Memory 
domain (M = 84.16, SD = 18.07) than participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (M = 
74.27, SD = 12.17) to a degree approaching significance, t(38) = 1.88, p = .068 . They 
also performed significantly better tasks of immediate verbal memory [t(38) = 2.25, p = 
.030] and verbal fluency and generativity [t(38) = 2.69, p = .010]. There were no 
significant differences across diagnostic categories on the remaining domains or tasks of 
the NAB-Screener. 
On average, participants completed Trails A in 44.2 seconds (SD = 21.46 
seconds) and Trails B in 98.62 seconds (SD = 44.06 seconds), a statistically significant 
time difference, t(33) = 10.66, p < .001. This is consistent with previous findings in 
schizophrenia of 40.9 seconds to complete Trails A and 97.5 seconds to complete Trails 
B (Perianez et al., 2007). Of the participants who completed Trails A, 7 were unable to 
complete Trails B because of frustration with the task or requiring more time than the 
task allowed. There were no significant differences across diagnostic categories on these 
instruments. 
Overall, participants identified 56% of facial emotions correctly on the Facial 
Emotion Identification Task. This is consistent with previous findings in schizophrenia of 
correct identification of 57% (Mueser et al., 1996). Participants were most successful at 
identifying happy faces (85% identified correctly) and least successful at identifying 
ashamed faces (34% identified correctly). On average, they correctly identified 
significantly more positive facial expressions (M = 80.5%, SD = 27.7) than negative 
facial expressions (M = 48.3%, SD = 22.1%), t(40) = 8.11, p <.001. There were no 
significant differences across diagnostic categories on this instrument, t < 1. 
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Performance on the Benton Facial Recognition Test indicated participants 
correctly identified 40.95 faces on average (SD = 2.35). This is comparable to, though 
slightly higher than, previous findings in schizophrenia of correct identification of 
approximately 36 faces (Mueser et al., 1996). There were no significant differences 
across diagnostic categories on this instrument, t < 1. 
The grand mean on the Social Functioning Scale was 122.89 (SD = 17.41), and 
scores on this instrument range from 0 to 223, with higher scores reflecting better social 
functioning. This score is comparable to previous reports in schizophrenia of total scores 
of 122.6 (Addington & Addington, 1999). Greatest performances were in the 
Interpersonal Behavior (M = 6.97, SD = 1.76) and Independence – Performance (M = 
29.26, SD = 6.21) domains. Weakest performances were in the Prosocial Activities (M = 
17.18, SD = 9.36) and Recreation (M = 19.08, SD = 4.96) domains. There were no 
significant differences across diagnostic categories on overall social functioning, t < 1, 
but participants with a diagnosis of an affective disorder engaged in significantly more 
prosocial activities than individuals with schizophrenia, t(35) = 2.18, p = .036. 
The grand mean on the Multnomah Community Ability Scale was 66.73 (SD = 
9.41), and scores on this instrument range from 17 to 85, with higher scores reflecting 
better community ability. This score is comparable to previous reports in schizophrenia 
of total scores of 66.5 (Prouteau et al., 2004). Participants’ ability was generally in the 
“slightly impaired” to “moderately impaired” range (average item score = 3.93, SD = 
1.08 on scale from 1 to 5, with 5 representing “no impairment”). Greatest performance 
was in the Behavior domain (M = 18.05, SD = 2.40), and weakest performance was in the 
Social Skills domain (M = 17.98, SD = 4.12), but there was no significant difference 
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between performance in these domains, t(40) < 1. There were no significant differences 
across diagnostic categories on overall community ability, t(38) = 1.42, p = .163, but 
participants with a diagnosis of an affective disorder had significantly more impairment 
in health behaviors (including mood regulation and stress management) than individuals 
with schizophrenia, t(38) = 2.52, p = .016. 
The grand mean on the Multnomah Community Ability Scale – Self Report 
version was 66.29 (SD = 8.58), and scores on this instrument range from 17 to 85, with 
higher scores reflecting better community ability. Participants’ ability was generally in 
the “slightly impaired” to “moderately impaired” range (average item score = 3.91, SD = 
1.10 on scale from 1 to 5, with 5 representing “no impairment”). Greatest performance 
was in the Behavior domain (M = 18.34, SD = 1.77), and weakest performance was in the 
Social Skills domain (M = 18.03, SD = 3.87) , but there was no significant difference 
between performance in these domains, t(37) < 1. There were no significant differences 
between clinicans’ ratings of participants’ community ability on the MCAS and 
participants’ self-reported ratings on the MCAS-SR (p > .10 in all cases). There were no 
significant differences across diagnostic categories on this instrument. 
There were 14 participants who had completed Social Cognition and Interaction 
Training and 24 who had completed Integrated Psychological Therapy. Of these, 12 had 
completed both SCIT and IPT and 15 participants who had completed neither SCIT nor 
IPT. Whereas 12 participants had completed IPT but not SCIT, only 2 participants had 
completed SCIT but not IPT. The overall pattern in the distribution was X²(1) = 5.39, p = 
.020, indicating that fewer people had completed SCIT but not IPT than expected. The 
sample was evenly divided across diagnostic categories (participants with a diagnosis of 
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an affective disorder vs. participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia) in participation in 
SCIT [X²(1) =0.74, p = .391] and IPT [X²(1) = 0.11, p = .744]. 
The correlation matrix of the variables included in the analyses indicated that 
there was no systematic variation among variables that would theoretically be more 
versus less related (see Appendices A-C). This precluded composition of composite latent 
variables such as an Emotion Regulation variable that includes all of the measures of 
emotion regulation in the study. Therefore, each hypothesis is tested with a series of 
models examining the results of various measures to determine whether the same kinds of 
predictive relationships hold for each of the measures of the relevant constructs.  
Variables were centered at the mean score for regression analyses. The categorical 
variable representing history of self-harm (DSHI) was coded such that 0 represented no 
history of self-harm and 1 represented a history of self-harm.  
Hypothesis 1: Symptom Severity and Emotion Regulation 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that more severe positive symptoms of psychosis would 
be associated with greater use of suppression as a regulatory strategy. Positive symptoms 
were tested with the Thought Disorder factor of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale 
(BPRS), and suppression was tested with the Suppression subscale of the Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ). Correlation analyses were conducted to examine the 
relationship between severity of positive symptoms and use of suppression as a 
regulatory strategy. As shown in Table 7.2, positive symptom severity and suppression 
were not significantly correlated (r = .11, p = .521), indicating that suppression did not 
contribute to predicting positive symptom severity.  
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The same analysis was repeated to examine the relationship between severity of 
positive symptoms and other indicators of emotion regulation. All measures of emotion 
regulation were non-significantly correlated with positive symptom severity, except 
greater emotion dysregulation as measured by the Difficulties with Emotion Regulation 
Scale (DERS) predicted more severe positive symptoms (r = .36, p = .025). Table 7.2 
summarizes the analysis results.  
The analyses were repeated to examine the relationship between global 
psychiatric symptom severity and indicators of emotion regulation. Again, suppression 
did not contribute to predicting global symptom severity (r = .14, p = .388). However, 
greater overall emotion dysregulation as measured by the DERS predicted more severe 
psychiatric symptoms (r = .60, p < .001), and this relationship approached significance 
as measured by RACERS (r = -.29, p = .083). Finally, individuals with a history of self-
harm tended to have more severe psychiatric symptoms than individuals with no history 
of self-harm (r = .44, p = .005). Table 7.2 summarizes the analysis results.  
Table 7.2. Correlation Matrix for Measures of Emotion Regulation and Symptom 
Severity 
 Emotion Regulation Measure Positive Symptom Severity Global Symptom Severity 
 ERQ   
  Suppression .11 .14 
  Reappraisal -.13 -.21 
 RACERS -.22 -.29* 
 DERS .36** .60*** 
 BVAQ .02 -.08 
 
DSHI 
0 = no history of self-harm 
1 = history of self-harm 
.11 .44*** 
Note.  
Bold values are p < .05. 
    *   Correlation is approaching significance at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
  **  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
***   Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Positive Symptom Severity = Thought Disorder factor of BPRS. 
Global Symptom Severity = Total BPRS score. 
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ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; higher scores = more use of that strategy. 
RACERS = Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = better emotion 
regulation. 
DERS = Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = worse emotion regulation. 
BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire; higher scores = more alexithymia. 
DSHI = Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory; 0 = no history of self-harm; 1 = history of self-harm. 
 
Overall, there was no evidence specifically supporting a relationship between 
positive symptoms of psychosis and suppression as a regulatory strategy. However, there 
is some evidence of a broader relationship between more global psychiatric symptoms 
and more global emotion dysregulation.  
Examination of the descriptive statistics indicated differences approaching 
significance between participants with diagnoses of affective disorders versus 
participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia on overall symptom severity [t(37) = 
2.01, p = .052] and global emotion dysregulation as measured by the DERS [t(35) = 1.89, 
p = .067]. This indicates that an interaction may exist that accounts for some of the 
relationship between symptom severity and emotion regulation. A multiple regression 
analysis was conducted to examine the interaction between emotion regulation (as 
measured by the DERS), symptom severity (as measured by the BPRS total score), and 
diagnostic category (as measured by binary grouping of affective diagnoses, coded 0, 
versus non-affective diagnoses, coded 1). In the regression, variables were centered at 
the mean prior to the analysis. The first model included symptom severity as a predictor 
of DERS total score; the second model added diagnostic category as a predictor; and a 
third model added the interaction between symptom severity and diagnostic category as a 
predictor, computed as the product of these variables.  
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The multiple regression model predicting emotion regulation from symptom 
severity (BPRS) produced R
2
 = .33, F(1, 35) = 17.14, p < .001. Adding diagnostic 
category as a predictor did not significantly improve the model fit (R
2Δ = .02, p = .276), 
nor did including the interaction between symptom severity and diagnostic category (R
2Δ 
= .01, p = .398). The final model produced R
2
 = .37, F (3, 33) = 6.35, p  = .002. In the 
final model, symptom severity had a significant positive regression weight (β = .62, p = 
.002). Diagnostic category had a non-significant regression weight (β = -.17, p = .245), as 
did the interaction between symptom severity and diagnostic category (β = -.15, p = 
.398). Overall, it does not appear that a distinction between affective and non-affective 
diagnoses is responsible for the relationship between symptom severity and emotion 
regulation. 
Hypothesis 2: Neurocognition and Emotion Regulation 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that individuals with better emotion regulation would have 
higher scores on neurocognitive assessments of attention, memory, and executive 
functioning. A series of analyses were used to test this hypothesis, using the following 
measures of emotion regulation: Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory (DSHI), Researcher and 
Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale (RACERS), Difficulties with Emotion Regulation 
Scale (DERS), Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ Reappraisal and Suppression 
subscales), and the Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ). Measures of 
neurocognition were separated into those measuring attention (NAB-Screener Attention 
domain and Trail Making Test A), memory (NAB-Screener Memory domain), and 
executive functioning (NAB-Screener Executive Functioning domain and Trail Making 
Test B). Correlations between each of these domains and the various assessments of 
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emotion regulation will be discussed individually. Table 7.3 summarizes the correlation 
results.  
Table 7.3. Correlation Matrix for Measures of Emotion Regulation and Neurocognition 
 
Emotion Regulation 
Measure 
Neurocognition Measure  
NAB-Screener Domain  Trail Making Test  
Attention Memory 
Executive 
Functioning 
 
A B  
 RACERS .05 .10 .07  -.13 .08  
 DERS        
  Nonacceptance .21 -.08 .30*  -.21 -.39**  
  Goals -.002 .03 .09  .03 -.14  
  Awareness .03 -.04 .06  -.08 -.14  
  Strategies -.03 -.12 .03  -.08 -.32*  
  Clarity .02 .03 -.05  .13 -.12  
  Impulse -.34** -.21 -.21  .22 -.02  
  Total -.02 -.10 .07  -.03 -.28  
 ERQ        
  Reappraisal -.08 .24 -.21  .32** .10  
  Suppression -.21 -.08 -.28*  .30* -.01  
 BVAQ        
  Cognitive Domain .16 .08 .01  -.07 -.25  
         Verbalizing .31* .22 .07  -.13 -.39**  
         Identifying .02 -.02 -.03  .01 -.03  
         Analyzing -.07 -.08 -.02  .003 -.07  
  Affective Domain .10 -.09 -.20  .16 .39**  
         Emotionalizing .08 .04 .06  .04 .37**  
         Fantasizing .08 -.15 -.31**  .19 .29*  
  Total .19 .01 -.12  .04 .03  
 
DSHI 
0 = no history of self-
harm 
1 = history of self-harm 
.05 .04 -.03 
 
-.25 -.26  
Note.  
Bold values are p < .05. 
  *  Correlation is approaching significance at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
RACERS = Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = better emotion 
regulation. 
DERS = Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = worse emotion regulation. 
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; higher scores = more use of that strategy. 
BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire; higher scores = more alexithymia. 
DSHI = Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory; 0 = no history of self-harm; 1 = history of self-harm. 
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Correlations between emotion regulation and attention. The NAB-Screener 
Attention domain was not significantly correlated with any of the measures of emotion 
regulation. However, it was significantly correlated with the Impulse Control subscale of 
the DERS (r = .34, p = .034). This indicates that individuals with higher attention scores 
tend to have better impulse control, though this relationship does not extend to the more 
global measure of emotion dysregulation.  
Trail Making Test A was only significantly correlated with the Reappraisal 
subscale of the ERQ (r = .32, p = .05). This indicates that individuals with higher 
processing speed tend to rely on reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy. The 
correlation between Trail Making Test A and the Suppression subscale of the ERQ was 
approaching significance (r = .30, p = .068), indicating that individuals with higher 
processing speed may also tend to use suppression as an emotion regulation strategy. 
Correlations between emotion regulation and memory. There were no 
significant correlations between the NAB-Screener Memory domain and any of the 
measures of emotion regulation, indicating the absence of a relationship between these 
constructs. Although participants with a diagnosis of an affective disorder had higher 
scores on the Memory domain than participants with a diagnosis of schizophrenia to a 
degree approaching significance, t(38) = 1.88, p = .068, controlling for diagnostic 
category did not bring any of the correlations between the NAB-Screener Memory 
domain and any of the measures of emotion regulation to significance, p > .05 in all 
instances. Therefore, the absence of a relationship between these constructs exists for 
participants with affective and non-affective diagnoses. 
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Correlations between emotion regulation and executive functioning. The 
NAB-Screener Executive Functioning domain was only significantly correlated with 
the Fantasizing subscale of the BVAQ (r = -.31, p = .047). This indicates that 
individuals with higher executive functioning scores are more likely to fantasize about 
virtual matters. The correlation between the NAB-Screener Executive Functioning 
domain and the Nonacceptance subscale of the DERS was approaching significance (r 
= .30, p = .071), indicating that individuals with higher executive functioning scores 
may be less likely to have an accepting attitude toward their emotional responses. The 
correlation between the NAB-Screener Executive Functioning domain and the 
Suppression subscale of the ERQ was also approaching significance (r = .30, p = .068), 
indicating that individuals with higher executive functioning scores may be more likely 
to use suppression as an emotion regulation strategy.  
Trail Making Test B was significantly correlated with the Nonacceptance subscale 
of the DERS (r = -.39, p = .031) and its correlation with the Strategies subscale of the 
DERS was approaching significance (r = -.32, p = .084). This indicates that individuals 
with greater ability to switch cognitive sets tend to be more accepting of their emotional 
responses but may have poorer access to emotion regulation strategies.  
Trail Making Test B was significantly correlated with the Affective domain of the 
BVAQ (r = .39, p = .023), indicating that individuals with greater ability to switch 
cognitive sets are more likely to experience arousal from emotional stimuli (r = .37, p = 
.031). Trail Making Test B was also significantly correlated with the Verbalizing 
subscale of the BVAQ (r = -.39, p = .023), indicating that individuals with greater ability 
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to switch cognitive sets are less able to verbally communicate about their emotional 
states.  
Multiple regression analyses predicting emotion regulation from 
neurocognition. Next, a series of multiple regression analyses were conducted to 
examine the relationship between emotion regulation and neurocognition. In each 
analysis, the five domains of the NAB-Screener (attention, language ability, memory, 
spatial ability, and executive functioning) were centered at the mean and simultaneously 
entered into the model predicting one of the measures of emotion regulation (DSHI, 
RACERS,  DERS, Reappraisal (ERQ), Suppression (ERQ), or BVAQ). In total, six 
analyses were conducted. The results are summarized in Table 7.4. Consistent with the 
limitations found in the correlation matrix, only one model approached significance: the 
model predicting alexithymia (BVAQ). The model produced R
2
 = .26, F(5, 35) = 2.47, p 
= .051. Significant regression weights included attention (β = .67, p = .007) and executive 
functioning (β = -.45, p = .034), indicating that these neurocognitive domains contribute 
to predicting alexithymia, after controlling for performance in other neurocognitive 
domains. 
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Table 7.4. Multiple Regression Models Predicting Emotion Regulation from 
Neurocognition 
  
Predictors  Model 
Criterion 
 
Constant Attention Language Memory 
Spatial 
Ability 
Executive 
Function 
 
R2 p (F) 
DSHI 
       
   
 
β 
 
.084 .106 -.002 -.027 -.117  
.017 .988 
p < .001 .765 .645 .991 .892 .642  
RACERS 
      
   
 
β 
 
-.195 .297 -.051 .139 .093  
.096 .625 
p .956 .471 .185 .797 .464 .701  
DERS 
       
   
 
β 
 
.050 -.235 .019 -.248 .177  
.129 .463 
p .927 .853 .282 .920 .186 .465  
ERQ Reappraisal 
    
   
 
β 
 
.089 -.056 .372 -.135 -.330  
.165 .303 
p .730 .736 .792 .055 .457 .169  
ERQ Suppression 
    
   
 
 
β 
 
.002 -.017 .022 -.060 -.263  
.080 .730 
p .937 .995 .939 .913 .754 .294  
BVAQ 
       
   
 
β 
 
.669 -.243 .045 -.233 -.451  
.261 .051 
p .999 .007 .216 .793 .151 .034  
Note.  
Bold values are p < .05.  
Each criterion represents a single regression equation with 5 predictors (the five domains of the NAB-
Screener: attention, language ability, memory, spatial ability, and executive functioning). Thus, this 
table represents the results of 6 independent regression equations.  
DSHI = Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory; 0 = no history of self-harm; 1 = history of self-harm. 
RACERS = Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = better emotion 
regulation. 
DERS = Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = worse emotion regulation. 
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; higher scores = more use of that strategy. 
BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire; higher scores = more alexithymia. 
 
Summary. Overall, neurocognition appears to explain very little of the variance 
in emotion regulation. However, as predicted, attention and executive functioning do 
have the greatest contribution to predicting emotion regulation. Moreover, they provide a 
unique contribution to predicting emotion regulation after controlling for other aspects of 
neurocognitive functioning. 
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Hypothesis 3: Social and Community Functioning and Emotion Regulation 
Correlations between social and community functioning and emotion 
regulation. Hypothesis 3a predicted that individuals with better emotion regulation will 
have higher scores on assessments of social and community functioning. Again, a series 
of analyses were used to test this hypothesis, using the five measures of emotion 
regulation [Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory (DSHI), Researcher and Consumer Emotion 
Regulation Scale (RACERS), Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS), 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ Reappraisal and Suppression subscales), and 
the Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ)] and the three measures of social 
and community functioning [Social Functioning Scale (SFS), Multnomah Community 
Ability Scale (MCAS), and Multnomah Community Ability Scale-Self Report (MCAS-
SR)]. The results are summarized in Table 7.5. 
Social functioning as measured by the Social Functioning Scale was correlated 
with measures of emotion regulation. Greater use of reappraisal (an indicator of good 
emotion regulation) as measured by the ERQ was correlated with better social 
functioning as measured by the SFS (r = .49, p = .002), with a particularly strong 
relationship with the Prosocial Activities (r = .52, p = .001) subscale. Individuals who 
had engaged in self-injury in the past (an indicator of poor emotion regulation) tended to 
have lower social functioning (r = -.56, p < .001), with particularly strong relationships to 
the interpersonal communication (r = -.60, p < .001) and prosocial activities (r = -.38, p = 
.019) subscales. Self-reported difficulties with emotion regulation as measured by the 
DERS were correlated with lower social functioning to a degree approaching significance 
(r = -.31, p = .056), and significantly correlated with the Social Engagement (r = -.39, p = 
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.016) and Interpersonal Communication (r = -.45, p = .005) subscales. Social functioning 
as measured by the SFS was not significantly correlated with emotion regulation as 
measured by RACERS (r = .08, p = .622), use of suppression as a regulatory strategy (r 
=-.06, p = .729), or alexithymia (r =-.11, p = .526).  
Social functioning as measured by the clinician version of the Multnomah 
Community Ability Scale was marginally related to difficulties with emotion regulation 
as measured by the DERS (r = -.29, p = .076) such that individuals with more difficulties 
with emotion regulation tended to have poorer community ability. Clinician-rated 
community ability was not correlated with a history of self-injury (r = -.02, p = .913), use 
of reappraisal as a regulatory strategy (r = .26, p = .119), use of suppression as a 
regulatory strategy (r = -.12, p = .475), emotion regulation as measured by RACERS (r = 
.08, p = .645), or alexithymia (r = .18, p = .259).  
Social functioning as measured by the self-report version of the Multnomah 
Community Ability Scale was correlated with measures of emotion regulation. 
Individuals with a history of self-injury tended to rate their overall community ability as 
lower (r = -.47, p = .003), and in particular their social skills (r = -.53, p = .001). Self-
reported community ability was also strongly correlated with self-reported emotion 
regulation as measured by RACERS (r = .38, p = .019). This relationship extended to the 
Adaptation (r = .42, p = .009) and Behavior (r = .33, p = .043) subscales. Difficulties 
with emotion regulation as measured by the DERS were strongly related to poorer 
community ability (r = -.64, p < .001), which extended to the Health (r = -.49, p = .002), 
Social Skills (r = -.55, p < .001), and Behavior (r = -.54, p < .001) subscales of the 
MCAS-SR. There was no relationship between use of reappraisal or suppression as 
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regulatory strategies and self-reported community ability (Reappraisal: r = .23, p = .157; 
Suppression: r = -.05, p = .752). Nor was there a relationship between alexithymia and 
self-reported community ability (r = -.21, p = .218). 
Table 7.5. Correlation Matrix for Measures of Emotion Regulation and Social and 
Community Functioning 
 
Emotion Regulation Measure 
Social and Community Functioning Measure  
SFS MCAS MCAS-SR  
 RACERS .083 .076 .380**  
 DERS -.313* -.291* -.639***  
 ERQ     
  Reappraisal .492*** .258 .234  
  Suppression -.058 -.119 -.053  
 BVAQ -.106 .180 -.205  
 
DSHI 
0 = no history of self-harm 
1 = history of self-harm 
-.561*** -.018 -.468*** 
 
Note. Bold values are p < .05. 
    *  Correlation is approaching significance at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
  **  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
RACERS = Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = better emotion 
regulation. 
DERS = Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = worse emotion regulation. 
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; higher scores = more use of that strategy. 
BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire; higher scores = more alexithymia. 
DSHI = Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory; 0 = no history of self-harm; 1 = history of self-harm. 
SFS = Social Functioning Scale; higher scores = better social functioning. 
MCAS = Multnomah Community Ability Scale; higher scores = better community ability. 
MCAS-SR = Multnomah Community Ability Scale – Self-Report; higher scores = better community 
ability. 
 
Interaction with severity of positive psychotic symptoms. Hypothesis 3b 
predicted that the relationship between emotion regulation and social and community 
functioning would interact with severity of positive psychotic symptoms. Multiple 
regression analyses were conducted to examine the interaction between emotion 
regulation, social functioning, and positive psychotic symptoms. Table 7.6 summarizes 
the correlation matrix between positive symptom severity and measures of social and 
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community functioning. Correlations between positive symptom severity and measures 
of emotion regulation were noted above, see Table 7.2.  
Positive symptom severity was significantly correlated with social functioning as 
measured by the SFS (r = -.31, p = .030) and MCAS-SR (r = -.29, p = .039), but not as 
measured by the MCAS (r = -.21, p = .102).  
Table 7.6. Correlation Matrix for Positive Symptom Severity and Social and 
Community Functioning 
  Positive Symptom Severity  
 SFS -.31**  
 MCAS -.21  
 MCAS-SR -.29**  
Note. Bold values are p < .05. 
    *  Correlation is approaching significance at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
  **  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
SFS = Social Functioning Scale; higher scores = better social functioning. 
MCAS = Multnomah Community Ability Scale; higher scores = better community ability. 
MCAS-SR = Multnomah Community Ability Scale – Self-Report; higher scores = better community 
ability. 
 
In all regression models reported below, variables were centered at the mean prior 
to the analysis. Each analysis followed a similar pattern of evaluating the interaction 
hypothesized in Hypothesis 3b: the first model includes a single measure of social 
functioning as a predictor for a single measure of emotion regulation; the second model 
adds positive symptom severity as a predictor; and the third model adds the interaction 
between positive symptom severity and social functioning as a predictor, computed as the 
product of these variables. 
Social Functioning Scale as predictor. As shown in Table 7.7, consistent with 
the correlation matrix, most of the multiple regression models predicting various 
measures of emotion regulation from social functioning (as measured by the Social 
Functioning Scale) produced nonsignficant models. The fit of these models was improved 
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neither by including positive symptom severity as a predictor nor by including the 
interaction between positive symptom severity and social functioning.  
Table 7.7. Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Emotion Regulation 
from Social Functioning, Positive Symptom Severity, and the Interaction between Social 
Functioning and Positive Symptom Severity 
Social 
Functioning 
Predictor 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Criterion R2
 
F p  R2Δ 
p 
(FΔ)  R2Δ 
p 
(FΔ)  
SFS            
 DSHI .315 16.571 <.001  .005 .631  .000 .938  
RACERS .007 0.248 .622  .043 .215  .120 .033  
DERS .098 3.914 .056  .079 .076  .080 .065  
Reappraisal (ERQ) .242 11.480 .002  .000 .892  .000 .947  
Suppression (ERQ) .003 0.122 .729  .009 .579  .006 .646  
BVAQ .011 0.411 .526  .019 .411  .001 .836  
MCAS            
 
DSHI .002 0.070 .793  .015 .477  .005 .691  
RACERS .014 0.501 .484  .041 .224  .000 .953  
DERS .085 3.335 .076  .095 .051  .000 .897  
Reappraisal (ERQ) .066 2.557 .119  .006 .628  .059 .137  
Suppression (ERQ) .014 0.521 .475  .007 .618  .011 .545  
BVAQ .037 1.416 .242  .009 .567  .102 .048  
MCAS-SR            
 DSHI .219 10.116 .003  .001 .852  .010 .513  
RACERS .144 6.058 .019  .014 .449  .015 .433  
DERS .409 24.880 <.001  .035 .148  .005 .573  
Reappraisal (ERQ) .055 2.094 .157  .005 .684  .068 .113  
Suppression (ERQ) .003 0.101 .752  .009 .571  .024 .367  
BVAQ .205 1.571 .218  .015 .507  .003 .760  
Note. 
Bold values are p < .05. 
Each row represents a single regression equation with a single predictor (either SFS, MCAS, or MCAS-SR) 
for Model 1.  
In Model 2, each row represents the regression equation from Model 1 with an additional predictor 
(positive symptom severity).  
In Model 3, each row represents the regression equation from Model 2 with an additional predictor 
(interaction between a single measure of social functioning and positive symptom severity).  
Thus, this table represents the results of 54 independent regression equations.  
DSHI = Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory; 0 = no history of self-harm; 1 = history of self-harm. 
RACERS = Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = better emotion 
regulation. 
DERS = Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = worse emotion regulation. 
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; higher scores = more use of that strategy. 
BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire; higher scores = more alexithymia. 
SFS = Social Functioning Scale; higher scores = better social functioning. 
MCAS = Multnomah Community Ability Scale; higher scores = better community ability. 
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MCAS-SR = Multnomah Community Ability Scale – Self-Report; higher scores = better community 
ability. 
 
There are two noteworthy exceptions. The multiple regression model predicting 
emotion regulation as measured by RACERS from social functioning (SFS) produced R
2
 
= .01, F < 1. Adding positive symptom severity to the model did not significantly 
improve the model fit (R
2Δ = .04, p = .215). However, including the interaction between 
positive symptom severity and social functioning significantly improved the model fit 
(R
2Δ = .12, p = .033). The final model produced R2 = .17, F (3, 34) = 2.33, p = .092. In 
the final model, social functioning had a non-significant regression weight (β = .14, p = 
.440) and positive symptom severity had a regression weight approaching significance (β 
= -.32, p = .071). The interaction between social functioning and positive symptom 
severity had a significant negative regression weight (β = -.39, p = .033), indicating that 
the relationship between social functioning and emotion regulation becomes less positive 
as symptom severity increases. Figure 7.1 shows the interaction graphically.  
When social functioning is above average (high), there is a significant relationship 
between positive symptom severity and emotion regulation such that individuals who 
have more severe positive symptoms tend to have worse emotion regulation than 
individuals with less severe positive symptoms (β = -.62, p = .016). The relationship 
between positive symptom severity and emotion regulation is somewhat smaller for 
individuals with average social functioning (β = -.32, p = .071), and it becomes zero for 
individuals with below average social functioning (β = -.02, p = .926).  
In general, there is a non-significantly positive relationship between social 
functioning and emotion regulation for individuals with few positive symptoms (β = .43, 
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p = .092), there is a non-significantly positive relationship for individuals with an average 
level of positive symptoms (β = .14, p = .440), and there is a non-significantly negative 
relationship for individuals with very severe positive symptoms (β = -.16, p = .377). 
Overall, positive symptoms have the greatest impact on the relationship between emotion 
regulation and social functioning when social functioning is high. 
Figure 7.1. Positive Symptoms Moderate Relationship between SFS and RACERS 
*  Mean difference is p < .05 
RACERS scores are centered such that 0 represents the grand mean.  
Low = individuals with scores one standard deviation below the grand mean. 
Medium = individuals with scores at the grand mean.  
High = individuals with scores one standard deviation above the grand mean. 
RACERS = Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = better emotion 
regulation. 
SFS = Social Functioning Scale; higher scores = better social functioning. 
Positive Symptoms = measured by Thought Disorder Factor of BPRS; higher scores = more severe positive 
symptoms  
 
Additionally, the multiple regression model predicting difficulties in emotion 
regulation as measured by DERS from social functioning (SFS) produced R
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36) = 3.91, p = .056. Adding positive symptom severity to the model improved the model 
fit to a degree approaching significance (R
2Δ = .08, p = .076). Similarly, including the 
interaction between positive symptom severity and social functioning improved the 
model fit to a degree approaching significance (R
2Δ = .08, p = .065). In the final model, 
social functioning had a negative regression weight approaching significance (β = -.32, p 
= .059), positive symptom severity had a significant positive regression weight (β = .38, p 
= .026), and their interaction had a regression weight approaching significance (β = .32, p 
= .065). Figure 7.2 shows the interaction graphically.  
When social functioning is above average (high), there is a significant relationship 
between positive symptom severity and emotion regulation such that individuals who 
have more severe positive symptoms tend to have worse emotion regulation than 
individuals with less severe positive symptoms (β = .62, p = .011). The relationship 
between positive symptom severity and emotion regulation is somewhat smaller for 
individuals with average social functioning (β = .38, p = .026), and it becomes non-
significant for individuals with below average social functioning (β = .13, p = .464).  
In general, there is a significant positive relationship between social functioning 
and emotion regulation for individuals with few positive symptoms (β = -.56, p = .023), 
such that fewer symptoms are associated with better emotion regulation as social 
functioning increases. There is also a positive relationship approaching significance for 
individuals with an average level of positive symptoms (β = -.38, p = .059), such that 
fewer symptoms are associated with better emotion regulation as social functioning 
increases. And there is no relationship between emotion regulation and social functioning 
for individuals with severe positive symptoms (β = -.08, p = .661). Overall, consistent 
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with the results obtained with RACERS, positive symptoms have the greatest impact on 
the relationship between emotion regulation and social functioning when social 
functioning is high. 
 
Figure 7.2. Positive Symptoms Moderate Relationship between SFS and DERS 
*  Mean difference is p < .05 
DERS scores are centered such that 0 represents the grand mean.  
Sx = Positive Symptoms as measured by Thought Disorder Factor of BPRS. 
Low = individuals with scores one standard deviation below the grand mean.  
Medium = individuals with scores at the grand mean. 
High = individuals with scores one standard deviation above the grand mean. 
DERS = Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = worse emotion regulation. 
SFS = Social Functioning Scale; higher scores = better social functioning. 
 
 
Multnomah Community Ability Scale as predictor. Similar to the results 
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the fit of which was not improved by including positive symptom severity as a predictor 
nor by including the interaction between positive symptom severity and community 
ability. Again, there are two noteworthy exceptions.  
The multiple regression model predicting difficulties in emotion regulation as 
measured by DERS from community ability (MCAS) produced R
2
 = .09, F(1, 36) = 3.34, 
p = .076. Adding positive symptom severity to the model improved the model fit to a 
degree approaching significance (R
2Δ = .10, p = .051). However, including the 
interaction between positive symptom severity and social functioning did not 
significantly improve model fit (R
2Δ = .00, p = .897). Nevertheless, positive symptom 
severity does appear to account for some of the relationship between emotion regulation 
and community ability.  
Additionally, the multiple regression model predicting alexithymia (BVAQ) as a 
proxy of emotion regulation from community ability (MCAS) produced R
2
 = .04, F(1, 
36) = 1.42, p = .242. Adding positive symptom severity to the model did not improve 
model fit (R
2Δ = .01, p = .567). However, adding the interaction between positive 
symptom severity and social functioning did significantly improve model fit (R
2Δ = .10, 
p = .048). In the final model, community ability had a non-significant regression weight 
(β = .22, p = .202) and positive symptom severity had a non-significant regression weight 
(β = .20, p = .254). The interaction between community ability and positive symptom 
severity had a significant positive regression weight (β = .34, p = .048), indicating that 
the relationship between social functioning and emotion regulation becomes more 
positive as symptom severity increases. Figure 7.3 shows the interaction graphically.  
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When community ability is below average (low), there is no relationship between 
positive symptom severity and alexithymia (β = -.04, p = .839). The relationship becomes 
more positive for individuals with average community ability (β = .20, p = .254) and it 
approaches significance for individuals with above average community ability (β = .44, p 
= .070), such that individuals with more severe positive symptoms tend to have more 
alexithymia than individuals with less severe positive symptoms.  
There is no relationship between community ability and alexithymia for 
individuals with few positive symptoms (β = -.04, p = .917). The relationship becomes 
more positive for individuals with an average level of positive symptoms (β = .37, p = 
.202), and it becomes significantly positive for individuals with above average levels of 
positive psychotic symptoms (β = .78, p = .029). Overall, consistent with the previous 
interaction results, positive symptoms have the greatest impact on the relationship 
between emotion regulation and community ability when community ability is high. 
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Figure 7.3. Positive Symptoms Moderate Relationship between MCAS and BVAQ 
BVAQ scores are centered such that 0 represents the grand mean.  
Sx = Positive Symptoms as measured by Thought Disorder Factor of BPRS. 
Low = individuals with scores one standard deviation below the grand mean. 
Medium = individuals with scores at the grand mean. 
High = individuals with scores one standard deviation above the grand mean. 
BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire; higher scores = more alexithymia. 
MCAS = Multnomah Community Ability Scale; higher scores = better community ability. 
 
Multnomah Community Ability Scale - Self Report version as predictor. Similar 
to the results obtained for the SFS and MCAS as predictors, most of the multiple 
regression models predicting various measures of emotion regulation from the MCAS 
produced nonsignficant models. None of the models were improved by including positive 
symptom severity as a predictor nor including the interaction between positive symptom 
severity and community ability.  
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Summary. Overall, there are strong relationships between emotion regulation and 
social and community functioning, such that better social and community functioning is 
associated with better emotion regulation. This holds across multiple measures. 
Moreover, this relationship interacts with severity of positive symptoms. The relationship 
between emotion regulation and positive symptom severity becomes greater as social 
functioning increases. Individuals with below average social functioning have difficulties 
with emotion regulation, regardless of the severity of their positive symptoms; but 
individuals with average and above average social functioning have many fewer 
difficulties with emotion regulation if their symptoms are well controlled than if their 
symptoms are severe. In addition, the relationship between emotion regulation and social 
functioning becomes greater as positive symptom severity decreases. People with very 
severe positive symptoms have difficulties with emotion regulation, regardless of how 
well they function in the community; but individuals with very few positive symptoms 
have fewer difficulties with emotion regulation as their social functioning improves. . . . . 
. . . . .  
Hypothesis 4: Group Treatment Participation and Emotion Regulation 
Hypothesis 4a predicted that individuals who have completed group treatment 
modalities will have better emotion regulation than those who have not. In the total 
sample, 26 individuals had completed a group treatment modality (SCIT and/or IPT). A 
series of one-way ANOVAS were conducted to determine if scores on various measures 
of emotion regulation differed between these groups. As shown in Table 7.8, there were 
no significant differences between the groups on any of the measures of emotion 
regulation.  
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Table 7.8. Group Means for Emotion Regulation by Completion of Group Skills Training 
Modalities 
Emotion Regulation Measure 
Group Skills Training Completion  
Yes (n = 26)  No (n = 15)  ANOVA  
M SD
  M SD  F p df  
RACERS  110.10 16.90  104.85 13.80  < 1    
DERS  80.96 22.54  95.25 24.95  3.086 .087 1, 36  
ERQ            
 Reappraisal 29.92 7.41  26.92 5.28  1.591 . 215 1, 36  
 Suppression 16.08 5.18  17.25 2.93  < 1    
BVAQ  111.42 16.16  109.60 12.84  < 1    
Note. 
Yes = Participants have completed Social Cognition and Interaction Training (SCIT) and/or Integrated 
Psychological Therapy (IPT). 
No = Participants have completed neither SCIT nor IPT. 
RACERS = Researcher and Consumer Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = better emotion 
regulation. 
DERS = Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scale; higher scores = worse emotion regulation. 
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; higher scores = more use of that strategy. 
BVAQ = Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire; higher scores = more alexithymia. 
 
Hypothesis 4b predicted that individuals who have completed a group treatment 
modality based on the specific deficit hypothesis (e.g., SCIT) will have better emotion 
regulation than individuals who have completed a group treatment modality based on the 
generalized deficit hypothesis (e.g., IPT). 
In the total sample, 2 individuals had completed only SCIT, 12 individuals had 
completed only IPT, and 12 individuals had completed both groups. The group of 
individuals who had completed a group treatment modality based on the specific deficit 
hypothesis was insufficient to compare to the group of individuals who had completed a 
group treatment modality based on the generalized deficit hypothesis.  
Overall, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that group treatment 
participation is associated with better emotion regulation. However, as the means were all 
in the expected direction, increasing statistical power may provide evidence in support of 
this hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 5: Emotion Regulation Pathways to Clinical Outcome 
A path analysis was conducted in Mplus to test the fit of the hypothesized model 
(see Figure 5.3) to the obtained data. Mplus allows for specification of simultaneous 
regression equations and therefore implies a very specific covariance matrix that better 
approximates the data than sequential regression equations. As composite variables were 
not created, it was necessary to choose individual measures to represent the constructs 
being studied.  
The NAB-Screener total score was chosen to represent the construct of 
neurocognition because it measured the broadest range of neurocognitive abilities. The 
FEIT total score was chosen to represent the construct of emotion perception because it 
was the only measure of this construct included in the battery. A binary variable was 
created to represent participation in group treatment modalities. Selection of other 
representative constructs was informed by the correlation matrix as follows.  
There were four predicted pathways to social functioning: from emotion 
perception, emotion regulation, symptom severity, and participation in group treatment 
modalities. There was a significant relationship between emotion perception and social 
functioning as measured by the SFS (r = -.48, p = .003). There were three significant 
relationships between emotion regulation and social functioning: between RACERS and 
MCAS-SR (r = .38, p = .019), between DERS and MCAS-SR (r = -.64, p < .001), and 
between ERQ Reappraisal and SFS (r = .49, p = .002). There were four significant 
relationships between symptom severity and social functioning: between positive 
symptoms and MCAS (r = -.37, p = .019), between total symptoms and SFS (r = -.49, p = 
.002), between total symptoms and MCAS (r = -.423, p = .006), and between total 
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symptoms and MCAS-SR (r = -.48, p = .003). Finally, there were two significant 
relationships between participation in group treatment modalities and social functioning, 
as measured by the SFS (r = .39, p = .016) and as measured by MCAS-SR (r = .33, p = 
.042). As there were relationships between all four constructs (i.e., emotion perception, 
emotion regulation, symptom severity, and participation in group treatment modalities) 
and SFS as a measure of social functioning, this measure was chosen to represent the 
construct of social functioning. ERQ Reappraisal was the only emotion regulation 
measure to correlate significantly with SFS, so that measure came to represent emotion 
regulation in the model. As total symptoms correlated with SFS whereas positive 
symptoms did not, total symptoms came to represent symptom severity in the model. 
Figure 7.4 represents the proposed model after the correlation analysis and including the 
instruments chosen to represent the constructs. 
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Figure 7.4. Hypothesized Path Model with Representative Measures 
NAB-Screener Total = Neuropsychological Assessment Battery Screening Total Score. 
FEIT = Facial Emotion Identification Test proportion correctly identified. 
IPT, SCIT Participation = Group Skills Training Participation; 0 = Participation in Social Cognition and 
Interaction Training (SCIT) and/or Integrated Psychological Therapy (IPT); 1 = Participation in neither 
SCIT nor IPT. 
BPRS Total = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale Total Score. 
ERQ Reappraisal = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire Reappraisal Score; higher scores = more use of 
reappraisal. 
DSHI = Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory; 0 = no history of self-harm; 1 = history of self-harm. 
SFS Total = Social Functioning Scale Total Score; higher scores = better social functioning. 
 
Next, a path analysis was conducted to evaluate the proposed model. As shown in 
Table 7.9, the hypothesized model did not adequately fit the data according to any of the 
fit statistics. Therefore, the model was revised on the basis of conceptual and theoretical 
foundations and empirical guidance (i.e., the normalized residuals for the covariances, 
NAB-Screener 
Total  
FEIT 
BPRS Total  
ERQ Reappraisal 
SFS Total  
DSHI - Binary 
IPT, SCIT 
Participation - 
Binary 
85 
 
correlations, and residual correlations of the models; modification indices; and model 
estimate results).  
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Table 7.9. Parameters of the Hypothesized Path Model 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable   Estimate SE p 
 
 
    NAB BPRS 
 
-.137 .160 .392 
NAB FEIT 
 
.363 .139 .009 
Group Skills Training FEIT 
 
.021 .150 .890 
NAB Reappraisal .212 .160 .186 
FEIT Reappraisal  -.503 .164 .002 
DSHI Reappraisal  -.236 .142 .096 
BPRS SFS 
 
-.401 .118 .001 
FEIT SFS -.440 .125 <.001 
Reappraisal SFS 
 
.240 .127 .059 
Group Skills Training SFS 
 
.214 .122 .080 
 
 
 
   
Intercepts 
BPRS  
 
-.101 .161 .533 
FEIT  
 
.047 .259 .855 
Reappraisal  
 
.297 .182 .103 
SFS  -.281 .206 .172 
 
 
 
   
Residual Variances 
BPRS  
 
.981 .044 <.001 
FEIT  
 
.867 .101 <.001 
Reappraisal  
 
.707 .135 <.001 
SFS  
 
.467 .104 <.001 
 
 
 
   
R
2 
BPRS  
 
.019 .044 .669 
FEIT  
 
.133 .101 .188 
Reappraisal  
 
.273 .135 .043 
SFS  
 
.533 .104 <.001 
 
 
 
   
Model Fit 
Number of Free Parameters 
 
18 
  Loglikelihood, This model  
 
-505.658 
Loglikelihood, Saturated (unstructured) model 
 
-498.335   
AIC 
 
1047   
BIC 
 
1078   
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit          df = 6   (criterion: p>.05)   14.648    .066  
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (criterion: <.05)  .146   
CFI                                                                 (criterion: >.95)  .851   
TLI                                                                 (criterion: >.95)  .664   
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual    (criterion: <.08)  .122   
 Note.  
Bold values are p < .05.  
Estimates represent standardized estimates where appropriate.  
Criteria for the model fit statistics represent the accepted standards for adequate fit.  
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NAB = Neuropsychological Assessment Battery Screening Total Score. 
BPRS = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale Total Score. 
FEIT = Facial Emotion Identification Test proportion correctly identified. 
Group Skills Training = Group Skills Training Participation; 0 = Participation in Social Cognition and 
Interaction Training (SCIT) and/or Integrated Psychological Therapy (IPT); 1 = Participation in neither 
SCIT nor IPT. 
Reappraisal = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire Reappraisal Score; higher scores = more use of 
reappraisal. 
DSHI = Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory; 0 = no history of self-harm; 1 = history of self-harm. 
SFS = Social Functioning Scale Total Score; higher scores = better social functioning. 
 
The final model is represented in Figure 7.5 and summarized in Table 7.10. It has 
8 direct paths, 4 residual variances, 1 exogenous covariance, and 4 endogenous variable 
intercepts. The equation of this final model is as follows: 
 
where the variables represent the intercepts and slopes for person i.  
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Neurocognition
(NAB-Screener 
Total)
Emotion 
Perception
(FEIT)
Symptom 
Severity
(BPRS Total)
Emotion 
Regulation
(ERQ Reappraisal)
Social 
Functioning
(SFS) 
Self-Harm (DSHI 
– Binary)
0.37
0.41
0.80
0.87
0.77
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5. Final Path Model 
NAB-Screener Total = Neuropsychological Assessment Battery Screening Total Score. 
FEIT = Facial Emotion Identification Test proportion correctly identified. 
BPRS Total = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale Total Score. 
ERQ Reappraisal = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire Reappraisal Score; higher scores = more use of 
reappraisal. 
DSHI = Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory; 0 = no history of self-harm; 1 = history of self-harm. 
SFS = Social Functioning Scale Total Score; higher scores = better social functioning. 
 
  
Direct effect (β), p < .05 
Direct effect (β), p > .05 
Exogenous Covariance (σ) 
Residual (Endogenous) Variance (  
 ) 
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Table 7.10. Parameters of the Revised Path Model 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable   Estimate SE p 
 
 
    DSHI BPRS 
 
.445 .130 .001 
NAB FEIT 
 
.365 .139 .009 
FEIT Reappraisal -.502 .164 .002 
DSHI Reappraisal  -.236 .141 .095 
BPRS SFS 
 
-.318 .115 .006 
FEIT SFS -.398 .122 .001 
Reappraisal SFS 
 
.205 .120 .088 
DSHI SFS 
 
-.301 .122 .013 
 
 
 
   
Covariance 
NAB, Reappraisal  
 
.242 .182 .184 
 
 
 
   
Intercepts 
BPRS  
 
-.494 .182 .007 
FEIT  
 
.077 .149 .608 
Reappraisal  
 
.295 .185 .111 
SFS  .301 .152 .047 
 
 
 
   
Residual Variances 
BPRS  
 
.802 .116 <.001 
FEIT  
 
.867 .101 <.001 
Reappraisal  
 
.770 .121 <.001 
SFS  
 
.409 .095 <.001 
 
 
 
   
R
2 
BPRS  
 
.198 .116 .087 
FEIT  
 
.133 .101 .189 
Reappraisal  
 
.230 .121 .058 
SFS  
 
.591 .095 <.001 
 
 
 
   
Model Fit 
Number of Free Parameters 
 
19 
  Loglikelihood, This model  
 
-666.663 
Loglikelihood, Saturated (unstructured) model 
 
-665.524   
AIC 
 
1371   
BIC 
 
1403   
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit           df = 6   (criterion: p>.05)  2.279  .892 
Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (criterion: <.05)  <.001   
CFI                                                                 (criterion: >.95)  1.000   
TLI                                                                 (criterion: >.95)  1.188   
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual    (criterion: <.08)  .037   
Note.  
Bold values are p < .05 and fit statistics that meet or exceed the accepted criterion for adequate fit.  
Estimates represent standardized estimates where appropriate.  
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Criteria for the model fit statistics represent the accepted standards for adequate fit.  
NAB = Neuropsychological Assessment Battery Screening Total Score. 
BPRS = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale Total Score. 
FEIT = Facial Emotion Identification Test proportion correctly identified. 
Group Skills Training = Group Skills Training Participation; 0 = Participation in Social Cognition and 
Interaction Training (SCIT) and/or Integrated Psychological Therapy (IPT); 1 = Participation in neither 
SCIT nor IPT. 
Reappraisal = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire Reappraisal Score; higher scores = more use of 
reappraisal. 
DSHI = Deliberate Self-Harm Inventory; 0 = no history of self-harm; 1 = history of self-harm. 
SFS = Social Functioning Scale Total Score; higher scores = better social functioning. 
 
In developing the final model, several pathways remained from the 
hypothesized model whereas several new pathways were created. The hypothesized 
pathways from neurocognition to social functioning via emotion perception followed 
from the results of Brekke et al., 2005 and were supported in the final model. The 
hypothesized pathway from neurocognition to social functioning via symptom severity 
followed from the results of Lipkovich et al., 2009. The hypothesized pathway from 
neurocognition to symptom severity did not remain in the model because of the absence 
of a correlation among these variables. However, the hypothesized pathway from 
symptom severity to social functioning was supported in the final model.  
The hypothesized pathways from participation in group treatment modalities to 
emotion perception and social functioning followed from Hypothesis 4. Neither 
pathway was included in the final model because of a failure to account for a sufficient 
portion of the variance.  
The hypothesized pathway from neurocognition to reappraisal followed from 
Hypothesis 2 but was eliminated from the model because of the absence of a correlation 
between the variables. However, a non-significant covariance did improve the fit of the 
model. Similarly, the pathways from self-harm to reappraisal and from reappraisal to 
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social functioning had non-significant contributions to the final model. However, both 
remained in the model because these pathways improved the model fit.  
A couple of pathways exist in the final model that were not hypothesized: a 
direct pathway from self-harm to social functioning and an indirect pathway from self-
harm to social functioning via symptom severity. Of note, the hypothesized pathway 
from emotion regulation to social functioning had a non-significant contribution to the 
model, but a pathway from self-harm to social functioning did significantly contribute 
to the model.  
The final model predicts two pathways from self-harm to social functioning: a 
direct pathway (DSHI to SFS) and an indirect pathway via symptom severity. Symptom 
severity did not significantly mediate the relationship between self-harm and social 
functioning (p = .068).  
The final model fit the data as well as a saturated (unstructured) model, which has 
all variance, covariances, and means estimated. The loglikelihood of the final model was 
-666.66, which closely approximates the loglikelihood of the saturated (unstructured) 
model, -665.52, indicating the final model accounts for the variances and covariances as 
well as the saturated (unstructured) model. The AIC was estimated to be 1371.33 and the 
BIC was estimated to be 1402.93, both indicating good fit. The chi-square test of model 
fit provides a likelihood ratio test comparing the final model to the saturated 
(unstructured) model and indicated that the final model fit equivalently to the saturated 
(unstructured) model, χ2(6) = 2.279, p = 0.89. The root mean square error of 
approximation is an index of model fit based on the approximated covariance matrix, 
where 0 indicates perfect fit. The estimate for the final model was less than 0.001, 
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indicating that the final model fits the data well. The Comparative Fit Index, comparing 
fit to an independence model of uncorrelated variables, was estimated to be 1.000, and 
the Tucker Lewis Index was estimated to be 1.188, both indicating good model fit (above 
0.95). Finally, the standardized root mean square residual provides the average 
standardized difference between the observed correlations and the model-predicted 
correlations. The estimate was 0.037, which is less than the criterion of 0.08, indicating 
the model fit the data well. In sum, all fit indices indicated the model fit the data well.  
In the final model, the unstandardized intercepts represent the expected means, 
centered at 0. Therefore, the mean emotion perception for individuals with average 
reappraisal, symptom severity, and social functioning is expected to be 0.28 units above 
average; the mean reappraisal for individuals with average emotion perception, symptom 
severity, and social functioning is expected to be 2.05 units above average; the mean 
symptom severity for individuals with average emotion perception, reappraisal, and 
social functioning is expected to be 4.2 units below average; and the mean social 
functioning for individuals with average emotion perception, reappraisal, and symptom 
severity is expected to be 5.17 units above average.  
The standardized pathways represent the slopes for predicting the dependent 
variables. A significant pathway from self-harm to symptom severity was found, such 
that for every one standard deviation increase in self-harm, symptom severity was 
expected to be higher by 0.45 standard deviations. The unstandardized coefficient 
indicates that individuals who have histories of self-harm have an average symptom 
severity 7.59 units higher than individuals who have no history of self-harm. A 
significant pathway from neurocognition to emotion perception was found, such that for 
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every one standard deviation increase in neurocognition, emotion perception was 
expected to be higher by 0.37 standard deviations. A significant pathway from emotion 
perception to reappraisal was found, such that for every one standard deviation increase 
in emotion perception, use of reappraisal was expected to be lower by 0.50 standard 
deviations, for individuals with no history of self-harm; and a non-significant pathway 
from self-harm to reappraisal was found, such that for every one standard deviation 
increase in self-harm, use of reappraisal was expected to be lower by 0.24 standard 
deviations, for individuals with an average emotion perception ability. The 
unstandardized coefficient indicates that individuals who have histories of self-harm have 
an average use of reappraisal 3.29 units lower than individuals who have no history of 
self-harm. Three significant pathways to social functioning were found, from emotion 
perception, symptom severity, and self-harm; and one non-significant pathway was 
found, from reappraisal. For every one standard deviation increase in emotion perception, 
social functioning was expected to be lower by 0.40 standard deviations, for individuals 
who have never self-harmed and who have average symptom severity and use of 
reappraisal. For every one standard deviation increase in symptom severity, social 
functioning was expected to be lower by 0.32 standard deviations, for individuals who 
have never self-harmed and who have average emotion perception and use of reappraisal. 
For every one standard deviation increase in self-harm, social functioning was expected 
to be lower by 0.30 standard deviations, for individuals who have average emotion 
perception, symptom severity, and use of reappraisal. The unstandardized coefficient 
indicates that individuals who have histories of self-harm have an average social 
functioning 10.38 units lower than individuals who have no history of self-harm, among 
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those with average emotion perception abilities, symptom severity, and use of 
reappraisal. Finally, for every one standard deviation increase in use of reappraisal, social 
functioning was expected to be non-significantly higher by 0.21 standard deviations, for 
individuals who have never self-harmed and who have average emotion perception and 
symptom severity.  
The model explained 13.3% of the variance of emotion perception abilities; 
19.8% of the variance in symptom severity; 23.0% of the variance in use of reappraisal; 
and 59.1% of the variance in social functioning. 
Overall, the hypothesis that emotion regulation can be incorporated in pathways 
to clinical outcome was supported.  
  
95 
 
CHAPTER 8 
DISCUSSION 
Results Summary 
Emotion dysregulation was hypothesized to be associated with more severe 
positive symptoms, poorer neurocognitive functioning, and poorer social and community 
functioning. The results were mixed across the various assessments of these domains.  
Difficulties with processing emotions were observed in the sample, consistent 
with previous research. These included difficulties expressing emotions, identifying 
facial emotions, and regulating emotions. Many participants presented with flat affect, 
indicating a deficit in expressing emotions. However, the sample did not necessarily 
indicate reduced emotional experience, as an assessment of alexithymia produced a 
normal distribution comparable to non-clinical populations. Consistent with previous 
research, participants also had difficulty perceiving facial emotions. Whereas they were 
relatively successful at identifying positive facial expressions such as happiness, they had 
the most difficulty with negative facial expressions, particularly ashamed faces. 
Participants also demonstrated difficulty regulating emotions on a variety of assessments. 
Of interest, they reported relying more on reappraisal strategies than suppression 
strategies to regulate their emotions. This appears inconsistent with the literature, which 
suggests that this population has a preference for strategies like suppression. However, 
the scores obtained for use of reappraisal and suppression in this study are consistent with 
earlier studies (e.g., Livingstone et al., 2009; van der Meer et al., 2009). It is important to 
note that, like healthy controls, this population tends to use reappraisal more than 
suppression to regulate their emotions. However, this population tends to use reappraisal 
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less than controls and suppression more than controls. Thus, in both populations, the 
overall preference is for reappraisal, although healthy controls have a much stronger 
preference for that particular regulatory strategy. This study is consistent with those 
results. 
The possibility remains that participants use emotion regulation strategies to alter 
their perception of their emotional experiences, thereby perceiving their abnormal 
emotional experiences as normal. However, the obtained results suggest that the emotion 
paradox is present in this population (i.e., the population tends to demonstrate reduced 
emotional expressiveness while reporting normal emotional experiences). The sample 
included in this study had relatively few psychiatric symptoms, including mood 
symptoms. It remains unclear whether a pathological excess of negative emotion (e.g., as 
seen in affective disorders) is associated with underutilization of strategies to induce 
positive emotional changes or with overuse of strategies to induce negative emotional 
changes. This important question about how this population regulates emotions during 
times of affective crisis is a critical finding that will have implications for treatment 
development. 
Contrary to previous research (e.g., Gross & John, 2003; Henry et al., 2008), use 
of suppression as a regulatory strategy was significantly associated with neither positive 
symptom severity nor global psychiatric symptom severity. Only one measure of 
emotion regulation (DERS) predicted positive symptom severity, such that greater 
emotion dysregulation was associated with more severe positive symptoms. Half of the 
measures of emotion regulation predicted global psychiatric symptom severity, such 
that greater emotion dysregulation was associated with more severe psychiatric 
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symptoms. The evidence was not strong enough to specifically link suppression as a 
regulatory strategy to psychiatric symptom severity; however, there was some evidence 
that there may be a relationship between psychiatric symptom severity and broader 
emotion dysregulation.  
In general, the sample had few psychiatric symptoms, especially positive 
symptoms, and this may have limited the associations that could be found between 
symptoms and emotion regulation. On the other hand, a sample whose symptoms are well 
controlled with pharmacological and behavioral interventions may be representative of 
the larger population, particularly those engaged in services founded on principles of 
rehabilitation and recovery. In that case, there may be a weaker relationship between 
these functional domains.  
Overall, there were few relationships between emotion regulation and 
neurocognitive abilities. A measure of attention was associated with use of reappraisal 
and suppression as regulatory strategies, and a measure of executive functioning was 
marginally associated with use of suppression, but there were no relationships between 
memory and any of the measures of emotion regulation. That there were no 
relationships between memory impairment and reappraisal is consistent with previous 
research (e.g., Gross & John, 2002; Richards & Gross, 2000). Of note, none of the 
measures of global emotion dysregulation (e.g., RACERS, DERS) significantly 
correlated with any of the measures of attention, memory, or executive functioning, 
suggesting that a relationship between these constructs might be specific to the 
regulatory strategies used and may not extend to more global indicators of emotion 
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regulation and dysregulation. In general, overall neurocognition appears to explain very 
little of the variance in emotion regulation in this population.  
With respect to social and community functioning, individuals with poorer 
emotion regulation, as measured by a variety of instruments, tended to have poorer self-
reported social functioning. Consistent with previous work (e.g., John & Gross, 2004), 
greater reliance on reappraisal as a regulatory strategy was associated with better social 
functioning, whereas no relationship was found between use of suppression and social 
functioning. Perhaps most interesting about these findings is that the strongest 
relationships between emotion dysregulation and social functioning were on the self-
report measures of social functioning (i.e., SFS and MCAS-SR). The measure of social 
functioning completed by practitioners familiar with the individuals’ functioning in the 
community did not significantly relate to any of the measures of emotion regulation. 
This could reflect an artifact of the instruments used or could represent a modicum of 
insight on the part of the participants regarding the impact of emotion regulation on 
social and community functioning.  
It was also hypothesized that positive symptom severity would account for some 
of the variance in the relationship between emotion regulation and social functioning. A 
few of the models indeed indicated this was the case. The interaction models indicated 
that positive symptoms have the greatest impact on emotion regulation when social 
functioning is above average and that social functioning has the greatest impact on 
emotion regulation when positive symptoms are below average. This suggests that 
individuals with SMI are best able to regulate their emotions during times of few 
psychotic symptoms and good social functioning. . . . . . . . . .  
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 Finally, contrary to what was hypothesized, having participated in group skills 
training was not related to better emotion regulation. The failure to find a relationship 
between skills training and emotion regulation may be attributable to insufficient 
statistical power. Indeed, the means were in the expected direction, indicating that 
group skills training may have an impact on improving emotion regulation or the skills 
required for more effectively regulating emotions. 
A path model summarized the relationships among the constructs of interest. 
Consistent with the theory that functional neurocognition is a prerequisite for any more 
molar biosystemic domain (including emotion regulation), the path model begins with 
neurocognition. The hypothesized pathway from neurocognition to emotion regulation 
did not remain in the model because of the absence of a correlation among these 
domains. However, that a covariance between these constructs improved the fit of the 
model indicates that neurocognitive abilities do account for some of the variance in use 
of reappraisal as a regulatory strategy, which may be mostly attributable to variance in 
the attention domain. These results are supportive of developing interventions based on 
the specific deficit hypothesis. Because neurocognition only accounted for a small 
proportion of the variance in emotion regulation, interventions based on the generalized 
deficit hypothesis may only result in slight improvements in emotion regulation. These 
results suggest that a more targeted intervention specifically aimed at remediating 
emotion processing deficits may demonstrate greater improvements.  
The pathway from emotion perception to emotion regulation with a negative 
regression weight is inconsistent with the emotion paradox, which implies that these 
constructs might have a positive relationship.  
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Non-significant pathways from self-harm to social functioning via emotion 
regulation remained in the model because of contributions to overall model fit, 
indicating that self-harm accounts for some of the variance in emotion regulation 
strategies, and that emotion regulation strategies in turn account for some of the 
variance in social functioning.  
In addition, pathways exist in the final model that were not hypothesized. A path 
between self-harm and social functioning via symptom severity is consistent with the 
regression models reported above indicating that symptom severity accounts for some 
of the variance in the relationship between emotion regulation and social functioning. 
However, symptom severity did not significantly mediate the relationship between self-
harm and social functioning, owing to its accounting for a small proportion of the 
variance. Finally, the hypothesized pathway from emotion regulation to social 
functioning had a non-significant contribution to the model, but a pathway from self-
harm to social functioning did significantly contribute to the model. It may be that a 
behavioral proxy of emotion regulation (i.e., self-harm) better accounts for variance in 
social functioning than the cognitive strategies used to regulate emotions (i.e., 
reappraisal).  
 Overall, in the final model, better neurocognitive abilities were associated with 
better emotion perception abilities. However, better emotion perception was associated 
with poorer emotion regulation (i.e., less use of reappraisal) and poorer social 
functioning. These unanticipated relationships are in fact among the strongest 
relationships in the model. A history of self-harm predicted more severe psychiatric 
symptoms, poorer emotion regulation, and poorer social functioning. The model 
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indicates that more severe psychiatric symptoms and poorer emotion regulation both 
predict poorer social functioning, but recall that an interaction was found among these 
domains that indicates this is a complicated relationship. Such interactions are not 
adequately represented in the path model.  
Limitations 
There are two major limitations to this study: the sample size and the assessment 
instruments. The failure to consistently find the hypothesized relationships between the 
constructs of interest is likely due in no small part to insufficient statistical power. This 
is particularly true for the hypotheses regarding the impact of group skills training on 
emotion regulation. In such a heterogeneous population, a larger sample size will more 
effectively stabilize estimates of the mean and variance, resulting in more accurate 
representations of the relationships among the constructs of interest. The multivariate 
interactions investigated in this study demonstrate that there are important relationships 
among subgroups of individuals and measures, but insufficient power conceals their 
significance.  
However, there is also a significant problem in validly and reliably measuring 
these constructs in this population, in particular the construct of emotion regulation. 
There is only one measure of emotion regulation specifically designed for this 
population (RACERS), and it has major limitations owing to its being recently 
developed and not having undergone the rigorous psychometric testing and revision 
necessary to improve its validity and reliability. The other measures of emotion 
regulation included in the battery have undergone more rigorous psychometric testing 
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but were not developed for the SMI population and therefore may not accurately 
measure emotion regulation in that population.  
Further understanding of emotion regulation in SMI will require that methods 
are developed for measuring the latent construct validly and reliably with enough 
sensitivity to detect longitudinal changes over the course of the illness. A 
conceptualization of emotion regulation as a multidimensional and dynamic construct 
requires that measurement also be multidimensional and dynamic. Integrating measures 
of multiple aspects of emotion regulation, such as behavioral, cognitive, and emotional 
measures from multiple sources (e.g., self-report, clinicians, family, direct observation, 
etc.), would be consistent with this approach. 
In addition to those limitations, the statistical analyses, including the path 
analysis, assumed all variables to be continuous, multivariate normal, and measured with 
perfect reliability. In reality, none of these conditions were met by the data. Therefore, 
the analysis presented in this manuscript is intended to be an initial hypothesis reflecting 
the relationships among the variables of interest. Further analyses using more 
sophisticated statistical techniques that more accurately represent the limitations of the 
data will result in a more accurate representation of the connections between and among 
the functional domains in SMI. 
Conclusions 
This study evaluated the multivariate relationships between emotion regulation 
and other biosystemic domains in outpatients with SMI. The results indicate that emotion 
regulation is a central domain in understanding neurocognitive functioning, social 
cognitive functioning, psychiatric symptom severity, and social functioning in this 
103 
 
population. Many questions remain unanswered, such as more specifically detailing the 
nature of the relationships among these domains, including potential interactions among 
the domains that more accurately represent variance. The population of interest in this 
study is heterogeneous, and the domain of emotion regulation is heterogeneous. The 
inconsistencies among the results are indicative of the many individual differences in 
abilities in this domain.  
Although the sample reported using antecedent-focused strategies to regulate 
their emotions, their preference for these strategies remained below what is found in 
healthy controls. That they tend to also rely on more maladaptive skills such as 
response-focused strategies indicates that skill training may be a beneficial treatment 
target. Nevertheless, it is critical to consider that no single regulatory strategy is 
inherently adaptive or maladaptive. Therefore, that response-focused strategies tend to 
be maladaptive in healthy controls does not necessarily indicate this is the case in the 
SMI population or in any particular individual. This highlights the need for valid 
assessment.  
The path model summarizing the results is consistent with the biosystemic 
theory of serious mental illness, which posits that the various processes are independent 
yet casually linked throughout the biosystem. Emotional responses entail coordinated 
and interrelated systemic changes in thoughts, behavior, and physiology. Thus, 
dysfunctional emotional responses will likely require intervention throughout the 
biosystem. The independence of the functional domains, as highlighted by their largely 
orthogonal relationships in this study, requires individual attention in clinical 
assessment and compels the development of separate, specific treatment and 
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rehabilitation interventions. Resolving questions such as the types of emotion 
regulation that are ongoing during affective crises in this population will also inform 
the skills such training modalities should target. An effective emotion regulation skills 
training modality would begin with assessment of adaptive strategies and follow with 
improving performance of skills individuals already possess while building their 
competence in alternative antecedent-focused strategies and their flexibility of 
emotional responses. While innovative and comprehensive modalities are being 
developed, utilizing existing treatment strategies in the psychiatric rehabilitation toolkit 
such as exercise and relaxation may prove beneficial.  
This research joins previous exploratory research in finding that schizophrenia 
and related disorders have a major affective component, despite their not being 
classified as affective disorders. The deficits and impairments in SMI extend to 
regulating emotional experiences, which has implications independent functioning, 
particularly interpersonal and occupational functioning. Further characterization of the 
emotional component of serious mental illnesses will inform treatment development 
and thereby contribute to the recovery of this population.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1
 It is important to note that some emotion regulation strategies may overlap with 
social skills, interpersonal problem solving skills, and so on. Indeed, stress management 
curricula often include training in those types of skills in addition to skills more 
obviously linked to managing stress and emotions. The distinction between stress 
management and emotion regulation is not clearly articulated in the literature. However, 
it can be argued that stress management is a broader term, including general lifestyle 
management as well as managing emotional reactions to environmental stressors, 
whereas emotion regulation refers specifically to strategies intended to change the type, 
timing, experience, or expression of emotions. This dissertation focuses on emotion 
regulation, as opposed to stress management. 
 
2
 Note that neurocognition here refers to neuropsychological processes, or the 
poorly understood processes responsible for performance on particular 
neuropsychological tasks. In other disciplines of psychology, neurocognition refers more 
specifically to molecular cognitive processes and their brain-based mechanisms.  
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APPENDIX 
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Appendix A: Correlation Matrix for  
Emotion Regulation by Symptoms, Neurocognition, Social Cognition, and Social Functioning 
 
Symptoms  
BPRS 
 Total -.285  .440** .471** .346* .548** .378* .398* .596**  -.206 .144  .255 -.307 -.518** .143 -.480** .259 -.078 
Neurocognition 
Trails 
 A -.134  -.207 .031 -.084 -.079 .130 .223 -.025  .320* .300  -.130 .194 .037 .003 .163 -.068 .043 
 B .075  -.389* -.137 -.141 -.315 -.119 -.021 -.282  .095 -.005  -.388* .291 .371* -.071 .389* -.248 .032 
NAB 
 Attention .052  .206 -.002 .027 -.033 .021 -.344* -.016  -.080 -.207  .305 .078 .077 -.066 .095 .155 .194 
 Lang .256  -.053 -.068 -.178 -.183 -.088 -.438** -.225  -.016 -.128  .137 -.012 .021 -.112 .001 -.076 -.065 
 Memory .102  -.083 .029 -.043 -.117 .030 -.212 -.101  .239 -.082  .219 -.148 .036 -.084 -.093 .083 .013 
 Spt Abil .209  -.184 -.080 -.176 -.171 -.259 -.358* -.271  -.087 -.125  -.103 -.163 .189 -.098 -.031 -.291 -.270 
 Exe Fnc .072  .296 .089 .064 .029 -.052 -.207 .068  -.214 -.277  .066 -.312* .059 -.015 -.204 .014 -.116 
 Total .168  .073 .016 -.051 -.093 -.075 -.399* -.111  -.039 -.188  .196 -.168 .085 -.104 -.084 -.016 -.067 
Social Cognition 
FEIT 
 Total .286  -.130 -.066 -.123 -.229 -.363* -.318 -.271  -.378* -.451**  -.141 -.114 .046 -.276 -.063 -.308 -.305 
BFRT 
 Total .331*  -.194 -.118 -.166 -.039 -.313 -.345* -.243  -.036 -.294  .046 -.032 -.031 -.168 -.039 -.128 -.135 
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Social Functioning 
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SFS 
 SocEng .128  -.257 -.354* -.304 -.244 -.412* -.222 -.389*  .065 -.139  -.287 .082 .232 .076 .171 -.320 -.167 
 IntCom .121  -.344* -.351* -.211 -.367* -.442** -.260 -.445**  .165 -.005  -.483** .010 .188 .008 .096 -.437** -.317 
 IndepC .119  -.211 -.426** -.023 -.170 -.062 -.319 -.271  .050 -.167  .179 .196 .212 .160 .246 .074 .224 
 IndepP .049  -.125 -.383* -.057 -.175 -.037 -.223 -.224  .096 -.258  -.372* -.049 .160 .021 .039 -.219 -.164 
 Recreat .173  -.155 -.039 -.198 -.050 -.290 -.054 -.164  .260 -.188  -.445** -.098 -.046 -.247 -.095 -.327* -.345* 
 Prosoc -.037  -.122 .132 -.211 -.050 .093 .122 -.026  .523** .293  -.107 .117 .141 -.139 .153 -.052 .054 
 Employ -.186  .300 -.098 .146 .137 -.080 -.069 .108  .306 .045  .092 -.144 .156 .068 -.033 .005 -.017 
 Total .083  -.241 -.330* -.232 -.207 -.184 -.212 -.313  .492** -.058  -.323* .071 .276 -.057 .183 -.259 -.106 
MCAS 
 Health .146  -.105 -.133 .002 -.085 -.195 -.254 -.164  .152 -.157  -.021 .206 .500** .060 .396* .074 .312* 
 Adapt .229  -.037 -.088 -.221 -.339* -.237 -.285 -.277  -.022 -.295  -.102 .012 .309* -.132 .158 -.131 -.014 
 SocSk -.211  -.029 -.158 -.317 -.154 -.033 -.044 -.164  .385* .175  -.251 -.044 .379* .111 .151 -.030 .068 
 Behavior .276  -.294 -.077 -.233 -.316 -.301 -.198 -.332*  .150 -.266  -.188 .223 .432** -.081 .376* -.077 .169 
 Total .076  -.125 -.162 -.271 -.276 -.220 -.235 -.291  .258 -.119  -.193 .114 .539** .013 .346* -.042 .180 
MCAS-Self Report 
 Health .261  -.393* -.420** -.120 -.452** -.295 -.422** -.489**  .121 -.038  -.286 .026 .291 -.025 .157 -.315 -.172 
 Adapt .416**  -.216 -.179 -.138 -.182 -.100 -.357* -.267  .085 -.148  -.190 .069 .045 -.171 .073 -.283 -.199 
 SocSk .205  -.602** -.298 -.345* -.437** -.309 -.336* -.547**  .286 .001  -.531** .170 .117 .024 .182 -.272 -.118 
 Behavior .330*  -.430** -.220 -.456** -.432** -.284 -.533** -.542**  .149 .004  -.213 .201 .094 -.117 .194 -.290 -.126 
 Total .380*  -.586** -.408* -.337* -.529** -.352* -.536** -.639**  .234 -.053  -.456** .147 .211 -.068 .209 -.392* -.205 
Note:      Bold values are p < .05. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Spt Abil = Spatial Ability; Exe Fnc = Executive Functions; SocEng = Social Engagement; IntCom = Interpersonal 
Communication; IndepC = Independence – Competence; IndepP = Independence – Performance; Recreat = 
Recreation; Prosoc = Prosocial Behavior; Employ = Employment; Adapt = Adaptation; SocSk = Social Skills 
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Appendix B: Correlation Matrix for Neurocognition by Symptoms, Social Cognition, and Social Functioning 
  Trails  NAB-Screener 
  A B  Attention Language Memory Spatial Ability Exec Functions Total 
Symptoms 
BPRS 
 Total .037 -.313  .012 -.076 -.058 -.224 -.060 -.109 
Social Cognition 
FEIT 
 Total -.167 .021  .154 .307 -.026 .421** .171 .308 
BFRT 
 Total -.256 -.214  .277 .263 .019 .391* .210 .328* 
Social Functioning 
SFS 
 Social Engagement .120 .262  -.216 -.019 .136 .299 -.101 .019 
 Interpersonal Communication .137 .210  -.322* -.302 -.036 .305 -.153 -.148 
 Independence – Competence -.124 -.151  .213 .106 .034 -.002 .058 .114 
 Independence - Performance -.240 -.027  -.036 -.121 .015 .057 .255 .016 
 Recreation .210 .187  -.312 -.393* -.218 -.279 -.123 -.375* 
 Prosocial Behavior .624** .377*  -.328* -.293 .019 -.217 -.239 -.299 
 Employment -.048 -.332  .145 -.147 -.086 -.083 .293 .014 
 Total .287 .218  -.236 -.336* -.036 -.121 -.024 -.231 
MCAS 
 Health -.235 -.142  .196 .017 -.182 .265 .244 .139 
 Adaptation -.086 -.076  .200 .180 .145 .084 .333* .224 
 Social Skills .102 .216  -.005 -.041 -.077 .097 .092 .011 
 Behavior -.089 -.107  .007 -.229 -.251 .163 .203 -.054 
 Total -.085 -.013  .124 -.021 -.123 .201 .270 .102 
  
  
1
3
5
 
  Trails  NAB-Screener 
  A B  Attention Language Memory Spatial Ability Exec Functions Total 
MCAS-SR 
 Health .000 .172  -.015 .021 .200 .302 -.038 .113 
 Adaptation -.347* -.198  .196 .131 .121 .207 .318 .278 
 Social Skills .147 .287  -.214 -.228 -.037 .104 -.152 -.158 
 Behavior .122 -.003  .069 .202 .218 .404* .014 .223 
 Total .003 .151  -.039 -.019 .146 .314 -.002 .094 
Note:     Bold values are p < .05. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
   * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
Exec Functions = Executive Functions 
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Appendix C: Correlation Matrix for  
Symptoms and Social Cognition by Social Functioning 
  Symptoms  Social Cognition 
  BPRS  FEIT BFRT 
Social Functioning Measure 
SFS 
 Social Engagement -.420
**
  .021 -.060 
 Interpersonal Communication -.368
*
  -.065 .162 
 Independence – Competence -.294  -.204 -.066 
 Independence - Performance -.110  -.212 .133 
 Recreation -.188  -.485
**
 -.144 
 Prosocial Behavior -.391
*
  -.071 .150 
 Employment -.107  -.272 .061 
 Total -.491
**
  -.475
**
 .010 
MCAS 
 Health -.503
**
  .140 .135 
 Adaptation -.043  .195 -.106 
 Social Skills -.267  .164 .002 
 Behavior -.434
**
  .217 .009 
 Total -.425
**
  .230 .022 
MCAS-SR 
 Health -.363
*
  -.008 .005 
 Adaptation -.201  .111 .204 
 Social Skills -.512
**
  -.309 .061 
 Behavior -.168  .028 .026 
 Total -.475
**
  -.109 .087 
   Note: Bold values are p < .05. 
  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
     * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
